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A “DIRECTED TRUST” APPROACH TO
INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY IN
AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY: A MODEST PROPOSAL
LUCIA A. SILECCHIA*

[I]t is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent with other
essential considerations and national policy, to improve
and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and
resources to the end that the Nation may . . . fulfill the
responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations. . . .1
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, much has been written about trust principles as a
useful lens through which to view environmental obligations—particularly
with respect to the obligations of the present generation to those who will
live in the generations to come.2
Legislatively, for the last half century, the National Environmental
Policy Act—the oft-touted “Magna Carta” of modern American environmental law—has urged policymakers to view environmental responsibility
through the lens of serving as trustees for future generations.3 State
constitutions, some foreign constitutions, international environmental
conventions, and the ethical frameworks of many religious and philosophical traditions also speak eloquently about holding environmental goods
in trust for the future.4 In a concrete way, litigation in highly publicized
*

Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. I am
deeply grateful to Kristina Hernandez, of the Catholic University DuFour Law Library,
and my student research assistants, Amber Donihue and Catherine Chiodo for their assistance with this project. I am also grateful to Dean Stephen C. Payne and the Columbus
School of Law for its generous support of faculty research and to my administrative
assistant, Barbara McCoy for all her help.
1
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 101(b), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970).
2
See infra note 9.
3
42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970).
4
See, e.g., Pope Francis, Laudato Si’: On Care for Our Common Home (May 24, 2015),
http://w2.vatican.va/content/dam/francesco/pdf/encyclicals/documents/papa-fran
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cases such as Juliana v. United States5 asks whether future generations
have a legal claim for violation of their rights as future beneficiaries of
common resources.6
cesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2UX-KMRB]. This papal
encyclical included a section on intergenerational responsibility in the context of environmental responsibility. Pope Francis explained:
The notion of the common good also extends to future generations. The
global economic crises have made painfully obvious the detrimental
effects of disregarding our common destiny, which cannot exclude those
who come after us. We can no longer speak of sustainable development
apart from intergenerational solidarity. Once we start to think about
the kind of world we are leaving to future generations, we look at things
differently; we realize that the world is a gift which we have freely
received and must share with others . . . . Intergenerational solidarity
is not optional, but rather a basic question of justice, since the world we
have received also belongs to those who will follow us. . . .
Id. ¶ 159. However, he also pointed out that the concern for future generations is not one to
be narrowly construed as concern merely for the physical environment. Pope Francis asks:
What kind of world do we want to leave to those who come after us, to
children who are now growing up? This question not only concerns the
environment in isolation; the issue cannot be approached piecemeal. . . .
It is no longer enough, then, simply to state that we should be concerned for future generations. We need to see that what is at stake is
our own dignity.
Id. ¶ 160.
At times, Pope Francis is pessimistic about the way in which we are responding to
the demands of intergenerational responsibility, concerned that “We may well be leaving
to coming generations debris, desolation and filth.” Id. ¶ 161. In addition, he also notes
the tension in balancing the demands of intergenerational responsibility with that of
intragenerational responsibility. See id. ¶ 162 (“[O]ur inability to think seriously about
future generations is linked to our inability to broaden the scope of our present interests
and to give consideration to those who remain excluded from development. Let us not
only keep the poor of the future in mind, but also today’s poor, whose life on this earth
is brief and who cannot keep on waiting.”).
5
Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1164–65 (9th Cir. 2020). A full and frequently
updated record of the case can be found at http://climatecasechart.com/case/juliana-v
-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/5YSK-6ZX4]. Other areas of the climatecasechart.com
website provide similar coverage of other climate litigation cases currently pending in the
United States and globally.
6
See Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1164. Much has been written about this case and the potential
changes it may bring to our thinking about the trust concept as a part of intergenerational
responsibility. See generally Michael C. Blumm & Mary Christina Wood, “No Ordinary
Lawsuit”: Climate Change, Due Process, and the Public Trust Doctrine, 67 AM. U. L. REV.
1 (2017) [hereinafter No Ordinary Lawsuit]; Andrew Johnson, Comment, Life, Liberty,
and a Stable Climate: The Potential of the State-Created Danger Doctrine in Climate Change
Litigation, 27 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 585 (2019); Thomas Sprankling et al.,
Climate Ruling May Help Future Plaintiffs Establish Causation, LAW 360 (Feb. 21, 2020);
Kim Bouwer, The Unsexy Future of Climate Change Litigation, 30 J. ENV’T L. 483 (2018);
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Underlying much of this discussion is the ancient public trust
doctrine as a vehicle for meeting that intergenerational responsibility.7

Bronson J. Pace, The Children’s Climate Lawsuit: A Critique of the Substance and Science
of the Preeminent Atmospheric Trust Litigation Case, Juliana v. United States, 55 IDAHO
L. REV. 85 (2019); Zachary L. Berliner, What About Uncle Sam? Carving a New Place for
the Public Trust Doctrine in Federal Climate Litigation, 21 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE
339 (2018); Sharon Buccino, Our Children’s Future: Applying Intergenerational Equity
to Public Land Management, 31 COLO. NAT. RES., ENERGY & ENV’T L. REV. 509, 516–17;
Robin Kundis Craig, Juliana, Climate Change, and the Constitution, 35 NAT RES. &
ENV’T 53 (2020); Maxine Burkett, Litigating Separate and Equal: Climate Justice and
the Fourth Branch, 72 STANFORD L. REV. ONLINE 145 (2020); Jeff Todd, A Fighting Stance
in Environmental Justice Litigation; 50 ENV’T L. 557, 559–609 (2020); Harrison Beck,
Locating Liability for Climate Change: A Comparative Analysis of Recent Trends in
Climate Jurisprudence, 50 ENV’T L. 855, 895–903 (2020); Jonathan P. Scoll, Atmospheric
Trust Litigation: “The Kids Can’t Wait,” 31 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 64 (2017). For an excellent
debate highlighting various perspectives on Juliana, see generally Erin Ryan et al.,
Juliana v. United States: Debating the Fundamentals of the Fundamental Right to a
Sustainable Climate (April 13, 2018) (FSU Law Review Rehearing 2018 Transcript)
(Online with FLA. ST. UNIV. L. REV.)
7
For a fuller discussion of the traditional public trust doctrine in the environmental
context, see, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970) [hereinafter Effective Judicial
Intervention]; Gerald Torres & Nathan Bellinger, The Public Trust: The Law’s DNA, 4
WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 281 (2014); Richard M. Frank, The Public Trust Doctrine:
Assessing Its Recent Past and Charting Its Future, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665 (2012); Mary
Christina Wood & Dan Galpern, Atmospheric Recovery Litigation: Making the Fossil Fuel
Industry Pay to Restore a Viable Climate System, 45 ENV’T L. 259 (2015); David Takacs,
The Public Trust Doctrine, Environmental Human Rights, and the Future of Private
Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 711 (2008); Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust
Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185 (1980) [hereinafter
Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine]; Mary Turnipseed et al., Reinvigorating the Public
Trust Doctrine: Expert Opinion on the Potential of a Public Trust Mandate in U.S. and
International Environmental Law, 52 ENV’T 6 (2010); Joel Reschly, Pesticides, Water Quality,
and the Public Trust Doctrine, 45 ENV’T L. REP. 10938 (Oct. 2015); Mary Christina Wood,
Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present
and Future Generations (Part I): Ecological Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift,
39 ENV’T L. 43 (2009) [hereinafter Ecological Realism]; Mary Christina Wood, Advancing
the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future
Generations (Part II): Instilling a Fiduciary Obligation in Governance, 39 ENV’T L. 91
(2009) [hereinafter Fiduciary Obligation]; William D. Araiza, The Public Trust Doctrine
as Interpretive Canon, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 693 (2012); George P. Smith II & Michael
Sweeney, The Public Trust Doctrine and Natural Law: Emanations Within a Penumbra,
33 B.C. ENV’T AFF. L. REV. 307 (2006); James L. Huffman, The Public Trust Doctrine: A
Brief (and True) History, 10 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENV’T L. 15 (2019) [hereinafter True
History]; Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae, and the Attorney General
as the Guardian of the State’s Natural Resources, 16 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. 57 (2005);
Brian E. Gray, Ensuring the Public Trust, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 973 (2012); Albert C.
Lin, Public Trust and Public Nuisance: Common Law Peas in a Pod, 45 U.C. DAVIS L.
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For centuries, this doctrine has asserted that some essential goods of the
earth are held in trust for the benefit of those yet to come.8 The theory of
the trust is inextricably intertwined with the obligation of intergenerational responsibility.9 It provides a legal expression of and framework for
this moral obligation. It recognizes that there is something unique about
the earth and all that is in it. This creates obligations not only to our
predecessors and contemporaries, but also to our successors, both biological and temporal.
However, while trust theory enjoys an impressive legal pedigree,
it has not gained as much traction in American environmental law as
might be expected or effective for addressing contemporary environmental issues.10 There are many complex reasons for this that are practical,
historical, political, economic, and legal.
One reason that the trust model is not as effective as it could be
in the environmental context is because there are parts of the trust
REV. 1075 (2012); Dave Owen, The Mono Lake Case, The Public Trust Doctrine, and the
Administrative State, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1099 (2012); Ronald B. Robie, Effective Implementation of the Public Trust Doctrine in California Water Resource Decision-Making:
A View from the Bench, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1155 (2012); James L. Huffman, A Fish Out
of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENV’T L. 527 (1989)
[hereinafter Fish Out of Water]; J. Peter Byrne, The Public Trust Doctrine, Legislation,
and Green Property: A Future Convergence?, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 915 (2012); Gerald
Torres, Who Owns the Sky?, 18 PACE ENV’T L. REV. 515 (2001); Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax
and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351 (1998); Jack Tuholske, Trusting
the Public Trust: Application of the Public Trust Doctrine to Groundwater Resources, 9
VT. J. ENV’T L. 189 (2008); Alexandra B. Klass, Renewable Energy and the Public Trust
Doctrine, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1021 (2012).
8
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
9
Intergenerational responsibility, as a legal principle in the environmental context, is
explored in the writings of many, including, e.g., EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO
FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY (1989); K.I. Vibhute, Environment, Present and Future Generations:
Intergenerational Equity, Justice and Responsibility, 39 J. INDIAN L. INST. 281 (1997);
Edith Brown Weiss, A Reply to Barresi’s “Beyond Fairness to Future Generations,” 11
TUL. ENV’T L.J. 89 (1997) [hereinafter Reply]; Lydia Slobodian, Defending the Future:
Intergeneration Equity in Climate Litigation, 32 GEO. ENV’T L. REV. 569 (2020); Buccino,
supra note 6; RICHARD P. HISKES, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO A GREEN FUTURE (2009); Burns
Weston, Climate Change and Intergenerational Justice: Foundational Reflections, 9 VT.
J. ENV’T L. 375 (2008). Important aspects of intergenerational equity models are critiqued
in Paul A. Barresi, Beyond Fairness to Future Generations: An Intergenerational Alternative
to Intergenerational Equity in the International Environmental Arena, 11 TUL. ENV’T L.J.
59 (1997); Edith Brown Weiss, Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the
Environment, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 198 (1990) [hereinafter Rights and Obligations].
10
See James L. Huffman, Why Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine Is Bad for the Public,
45 ENV’T L. 337, 337 (2015).
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analogy that simply do not exist in a clear, obvious way. Traditional trust
doctrine requires a settlor, who entrusts the defined res of the trust to a
trustee (or to multiple trustees) in a trust instrument that clearly sets forth
obligations to defined classes of beneficiaries, present and future.11 The
actions of the trustee are governed by the demands of the trust instrument as well as by well-established fiduciary obligations such as care and
loyalty.12 To be effective, a well-established trust has, at a minimum, a
known settlor, a clearly written trust agreement, and a well-defined res.13
The trust analogy in the environmental law context lacks all of these.
Certainly, the traditional public trust doctrine holds some expectations about what would constitute the res, and some generally accepted
limitations that could constitute terms of a “trust agreement.”14 However,
as environmental regulation grows increasingly complex, as the migratory
nature of environmental problems becomes more apparent, and as each
year brings increased understanding of the interconnectedness of all creation,15 the utility of the traditional trust paradigm may be diminished—
unless it is expanded into something significantly different.
Paradoxically, at the very same time, today’s dissatisfaction with
the highly politicized environmental statutory and administrative regime
gives the trust doctrine a renewed appeal because of its straightforward
conceptual approach and its deeply moral, rather than merely pragmatic,
underpinnings. Yet, this appeal does not easily translate into a clear-cut
path for using trust doctrine in a reasoned way, in spite of recent efforts
to do just that.16
This Article will consider whether there is any value in creatively
borrowing from modern developments in trust law to devise a more narrowly focused way to keep future needs in our present debates.
11

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 3 (1957).
The trust is described succinctly in Ecological Realism, supra note 7, at 67 (“The beneficiaries hold the beneficial title to all assets in the trust. The trustee holds legal title,
encumbered with the responsibility to manage the trust strictly for the beneficiaries. This
construct imposes a responsibility on government, as the trustee, to protect the assets . . .
in the intent of the beneficiary class. In the case of the public trust, the beneficiaries are
the citizens, both present and future generations.”).
13
Id. at 67–69.
14
See Effective Judicial Intervention, supra note 7, at 475–91.
15
See Robert O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate Change,
9 PERSP. ON POL. 7, 7–8 (Mar. 2011); Abrahm Lustgarten, The Great Climate Migration,
N.Y. TIMES MAG. (July 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/23/maga
zine/climate-migration.html [https://perma.cc/J84R-XPMN].
16
See Richard M. Frank, The Public Trust Doctrine: Assessing Its Recent Past and
Charting Its Future, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665, 671–86 (2012).
12
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This Article will begin by acknowledging the importance of intergenerational solidarity and the solemn responsibility of preserving environmental assets for future generations. It will then, very briefly, review
the ways in which trust doctrine has been a vehicle for expressing and
implementing principles of intergenerational responsibility in the environmental context.
It will then discuss the practical difficulties with the trust paradigm in the environmental context, with a particular focus on the way in
which it pays insufficient attention to how we identify the settlor, define
the res, and determine the terms of the trust agreement. This is particularly problematic when the nature of those terms may have to change
dramatically as conditions and knowledge change over time. The Juliana
litigation will be offered as an illustration of these difficulties.17
The Article will then propose that one approach to making ancient
trust theory more useful as a way to protect environmental resources is
to incorporate, in some manner, the modern concept of a “trust director”
or “directed trust” function into the environmental regulatory regime. It
will first discuss what a “directed trust” means in the private trust context.
Then, it will explore some of the reasons such a model may be of use in
the complex realm of environmental protection. Finally, it will acknowledge that while the precise mechanism by which this might be done is
not entirely clear, the concept of conferring on some entity specific powers
over alleged trust resources and the actions, vel non, of the trustees, is
worth bringing to the complex field of environmental protection.
I.

INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND POLICY

There are few areas in which an obligation to those in other generations is more obvious than in the context of environmental law and
policy. It is well established that various activities—whether man-made
or naturally occurring, whether beneficial or harmful—can all have an
impact on the natural world for years to come.18 At times, it is also
difficult or even impossible to reverse these impacts.19
17

Brief of Amici Curiae, Env’t Hist. Professors in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Answering Brief at 8–10, Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
18
See generally NATUREWORKS, https://nhpbs.org/natureworks/ [https://perma.cc/S2RU
-63GD] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020).
19
Many have commented on this attribute of the natural world. See Torres & Bellinger,
supra note 7, at 292 (“Natural resources . . . are complicated and delicate. Without proper
care these resources can deteriorate to a point where restoration is no longer possible.”).
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Certainly, the notion of intergenerational solidarity extends to
any area in which obligations to past and future generations must be
protected and honored.20 However, it is particularly compelling in the
environmental context.21 It often requires study of benefits and burdens
that may still be speculative—at least in part. It may involve the interests of those who have no one in the legal or political arena to represent
them.22 This task may fall prey to unrealistic optimism that tomorrow’s
problems will take care of themselves. Alternatively, it may fall prey to
unrealistic pessimism that the problems of tomorrow are too overwhelming to tackle in any meaningful way today.23 Yet, we are all, indeed, “heirs
of a legacy that is the work of many generations and [we] will in turn
provide an inheritance for [our] successors.”24
This mandate to honor our ancestors and our descendants should
be reflected in environmental law and policy. How to do so raises profound
public policy questions. For example, how can we accurately predict what

20
Others from various disciplines have studied this question from various perspectives.
See, e.g., JANNA THOMPSON, INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
IN AN INTERGENERATIONAL POLITY (2009) [hereinafter INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE].
21
See sources cited supra note 9.
22
See, e.g., David Coursen, Environmental Injustice is Even Worse than We Thought,
RESILIENCE (June 18, 2020), https://www.resilience.org/stories/2020-06-18/environmental
-injustice-is-even-worse-than-we-thought/ [https://perma.cc/TJN9-Q22P].
23
See, e.g., William E. Rees, Don’t Call Me a Pessimist on Climate Change. I am a Realist,
TYEE (Nov. 11, 2019), https://thetyee.ca/Analysis/2019/11/11/Climate-Change-Realist
-Face-Facts/ [https://perma.cc/H3CU-H84M]. This conflict is discussed more fully in
Slobodian, supra note 9, at 587, in which the author observed:
A central tension in realizing intergenerational equity is how to weigh
the needs of the present against the needs of the future . . . . Past
generations have often lacked the technology and economic conditions
to extract or use many of the mineral resources we rely on today . . . .
While future generations are likely to face significant climate-related
challenges, they are also likely to continue to develop both economically
and technologically. This reasoning has been used to justify the practice
of discounting both the benefits and costs of future natural resource
management in relation to current costs and benefits.
Id.
24
INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 20, at 1. See also id. at 7 (“[C]itizens, as well
as outsiders, have interests that can only be satisfied in a society in which each generation takes responsibility for the affairs of its predecessors and accepts obligations to its
political successors.”); Reply, supra note 9, at 89 (calling the notion of intergenerational
responsibility one that “already strikes a deep chord within the major cultural and legal
traditions of the world”); Reply, supra note 9, at 97 (“[A]n intergenerational principle of
fairness has already struck a deep chord within many different cultural traditions. It
builds upon a history of implicit and explicit concern for future generations.”).
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future generations will need or want? How can we be sure that they will
be unable to meet those needs through creative technical solutions of their
own that we cannot even contemplate? How can we be certain that it is
morally justifiable to place the needs of future generations ahead of the
needs of the poorest of our own contemporaries when there appear to be
intractable conflicts between them? How can we fairly determine whether
and which decisions we make will take particular options away from those
who come after us?25 What are the economic ramifications for considering
the burdens on future generations that will result from inaction or imprudent action today?26 How can we avoid being overwhelmed when the
scope of tomorrow’s problems seems to be vast beyond our comprehension?
Likewise, a critical aspect of intergenerational responsibility in
the environmental context that does not receive much attention is the
question of our responsibilities to those generations who came before us.
Is there an obligation to remember and be bound by the good done by those
in prior generations and to honor the heritage—including the natural
world—which we inherited from them? Is part of our obligation to those
who follow us built on what we have received from those who came before
us? Should—and how does—gratitude for what we received from our
ancestors motivate our concern for what we leave to our descendants? To
what extent should the preferences and values of our ancestors with
respect to the natural world play a part in our modern understanding of
our own obligations? How might we reconcile differences between their
values and our own? Some argue that:
The citizens of each generation are entitled to demand
that their successors remember the sacrifices they made
for the sake of posterity. They are entitled to demand that
their successors make an effort to understand and appreciate the intergenerational goods that they inherit, and
appreciate why their predecessors wanted to provide these
things as an inheritance for future generations.27
25

See Rights and Obligations, supra note 9, at 202 (warning against decisions that will
“unduly restrict the options available to future generations”).
26
See generally Stephen Marks, Valuing the Future: Intergenerational Discounting, Its
Problems, and a Modest Proposal, 41 B.U. SCH. L. 10615 (July 11, 2011) (discussing intergenerational investment decisions and their ramifications).
27
INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 20, at 97. See also id. at 98 (“We should
maintain records, memorials, and other forms of commemoration. We should preserve the
heritage of past generations and the things that they regarded as valuable—at least to
the extent that this does not impose unacceptable burdens on us.”).
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Regardless of how the concept of intergenerational responsibility
is framed, our obligations to future generations are more clearly understood in the context of the ways in which our own predecessors bequeathed—or failed to bequeath—to us the goods of the created world.28
It can also be a sobering recollection in our own environmental planning
if we recall that we will one day be the “ancestors” of future generations
who will judge us for the inheritance we left to them.29 This should inspire law and policy makers to avoid falling prey to short-term temptations
and ecological gambles.30
Because environmental obligations have long been understood to
span the generations, various legal frameworks developed to express and
honor this.31 From ancient days, one of the most compelling of these
frameworks has been moored in trust theory.32
II.

OBLIGATIONS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: THE APPEAL OF THE
TRUST CONCEPT

The ancient public trust doctrine, or “PTD,” is a traditional structure invoked when seeking a source for and model of a legal responsibility to the public at large, with particular concern for future generations.33

28

Cf. Weston, supra note 9, at 380 (“If future generations cannot be said to have a legal basis
for asserting ecological rights vis-à-vis present generations, then neither can it be said that
present generations can have corresponding legal duties relative to future generations.”).
29
See INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 20, at 98. See also Buccino supra note 6,
at 512–13 (noting that “[t]he current generation can spend dividends generated by the
principal but cannot spend down the principal itself.”).
30
See, e.g., Wood & Galpern, supra note 7, at 275 (arguing that “[a] constitutional trust
over crucial resources remains essential for the endurance of the nation because it prevents any one set of legislators from destroying ecology that is crucial to perpetuating and
sustaining the nation as a whole through the generations of citizens. Legislators stand
under constant temptation to commit public resources to industry supporters in return
for campaign contributions.”).
31
See Weston. supra note 9, at 378–79.
32
Alternate perspectives and legal models other than the trust paradigm exist to express
intergenerational obligations. See, e.g., Weston, supra note 9, at 378–79 (using a lease
analogy).
33
For historical background to the public trust doctrine, see generally James L. Huffman,
Speaking of Inconvenient Truths—A History of the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENV’T
L.& POL. F. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Speaking of Inconvenient Truths]; Charles F. Wilkinson,
The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENV’T L. 425, passim (1989); see also Takacs, supra note 7, at 713–15;
this history was also referenced in Brief of Amicus Curiae Law Professors in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Answering Brief at 5–6, Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159
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Indeed, “[f]or centuries, people have utilized some version of this doctrine
by preserving portions of the environment for the greater public good.”34
The doctrine, according to some, may be “undergoing a modern
resurgence”35 in our times as a means to address the obligations we bear
to those who will come after us. Because the trust is a well-established
concept and not a novel theory,36 “[p]ackaging problems of planetary ecology in . . . trust-based property terms enables domestic courts of various
nations to summon clear and enforceable fiduciary standards to hold
political leaders accountable for ecological duties.”37 In the context of
environmental protection, the consensus is that “concern for future citizens
is the raison d’etre for the trust.”38 Thus, the public trust has particular appeal for those seeking a model for protecting the interests of future generations. It uses a well-established legal doctrine to preserve public goods
whose value and fragility are more greatly appreciated than ever before.39
Much has been written about the use of public trust principles in
the context of environmental protection.40 As many have already written
on this, this Article will not discuss it in any depth. Instead, it will merely
describe it in the briefest of ways to illustrate its inherent limitations as
the vehicle through which the interests of future generations can be
properly considered.41
A.

Traditional Public Trust Doctrine in the United States

The traditional public trust doctrine is the basis for much of the use
of trust principles (and rhetoric) for long term environmental protection.42
In American domestic law, “there are 50 state PTDs, intimations of a
(2019) (No. 18-36082); Brief of Amici Curiae Environmental History Professors in Support
of Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Answering Brief passim United States v. Juliana, 947 F.3d 1159
(2019) (No. 18-36082) [hereinafter Environmental History Brief]; Kanner, supra note 7,
at 62–70; True History, supra note 7, passim.
34
Smith & Sweeney, supra note 7, at 308.
35
Reschly, supra note 7, at 10938.
36
Turnipseed et al., supra note 7, at 6. See also Wilkinson, supra note 33, at 425 (acknowledging that “[t]he public trust doctrine is complicated—there are fifty-one public
trust doctrines in this country alone.”).
37
Wood & Galpern, supra note 7, at 300.
38
Ecological Realism, supra note 7, at 68.
39
See id. at 68.
40
See, e.g., discussion supra note 7.
41
For a forceful critique of the public trust doctrine and its limitations, see generally
Huffman, supra note 10, at 349–69.
42
See Ecological Realism, supra note 7, at 68.
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federal PTD, and the doctrine has also increasingly appeared in legal
systems outside of the United States.”43
As was true in ancient times, it was in the context of navigable
waters that the doctrine received its earliest attention in American domestic jurisprudence44 and where much of the theory involving the public
trust doctrine has developed.
In Illinois Central,45 one of the earliest, comprehensive statements
of the public trust doctrine in the United States, the Supreme Court
engaged in a lengthy discussion of the doctrine. In doing so, it set forth
some basic principles that are still highly relevant in understanding this
doctrine today.46 Scholarly commentary on Illinois Central emphasizes
the important role of federal law in creating the trust,47 while also recognizing that “[l]ater Supreme Court cases have recognized that states are
accorded broad discretion in administering the trust.”48 With respect, at
least, to water, various sources for the doctrine have been identified.49
In 1970, Joseph Sax ushered in a new era of scholarship on the
public trust doctrine in his seminal work, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention.50 He boldly declared
that “[o]f all the concepts known to American law, only the public trust
doctrine seems to have the breadth and substantive content which might
make it useful as a tool of general application for citizens seeking to
develop a comprehensive legal approach to resource management problems.”51 This was an optimistic assessment of the doctrine’s potential to
protect both present and future generations.
Perhaps it was not mere coincidence that Sax’s landmark article
appeared in the same year in which the “modern” era of domestic
43

Turnipseed et al., supra note 7, at 6.
This water-oriented focus is explored more fully by many commentators, including
Smith & Sweeney, supra note 7, at 310–14; Huffman, supra note 10, at 338; id. at 345–49;
Fish Out of Water, supra note 7, at 530–32; and Effective Judicial Intervention, supra
note 7, at 475–78.
45
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. State of Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
46
See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust
Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799, 800–05 (2004).
47
Illinois Central is still widely discussed. See discussion supra note 7; see also Kearney
& Merrill, supra note 46, at 800–05.
48
Wilkinson, supra note 33, at 455.
49
Id. at 455–56 (suggesting that these sources could include such diverse theories as
“federal common law,” or “the guarantee clause of the Constitution,” or “constitutional
preemption,” or “the commerce clause”).
50
Effective Judicial Intervention, supra note 7.
51
Id. at 474.
44
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environmental law began with the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency, the launching of the first Earth Day, and the passage of the
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).52 This renewed interest in
the public trust doctrine at the same time that the modern environmental statutory scheme was developing is but one indication as to how
intertwined these themes are in the quest to preserve the goods of the
earth for those who will come after us.53 The trust theory and the statutory
regime, however, are fundamentally different tools to advance environmental protection.
B.

Trust Doctrine in the Statutory Law of the United States

In the view of one commentator, the trust concept is “[a]n ancient
yet enduring legal principle [that] underlies modern environmental
statutory law.”54 Thus, in a limited way, some environmental statutes
have tried to build on the notion of the public trust doctrine and incorporate trust doctrine into their terms.55
Nowhere is this more explicit than in NEPA.56 NEPA states as a
matter of broad national policy that there is an obligation of the Federal
Government to “improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may . . . fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding
generations.”57 NEPA speaks eloquently of the need to “fulfill the social,
economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of
Americans,”58 and phrases such as “restore” and “preserve” indicate an
interest in remedying the harms of the past and safeguarding goods for
the future.59 Yet, even NEPA itself is silent as to what, in fact, it means
52

Id.; 5 U.S.C.A. § App. 1 Reorg. Plan 3 1970; About Us: The History of Earth Day, https://
www.earthday.org/history/ [https://perma.cc/2X9Q-QGUD] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020);
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (1970).
53
See discussion, supra note 7.
54
Ecological Realism, supra note 7, at 45. See also Fiduciary Obligation, supra note 7,
at 103 (“Trust principles underlie statutory law. . . . [S]tatutory law provides bureaucratic
structure and process, while the trust doctrine supplies a firm obligation that can steer
agency discretion to carry out the protective goals of the statutes.”).
55
See Turnipseed et al., supra note 7, at 10 (reviewing the trust principles found in
various federal environmental statutes).
56
See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 101, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (1970).
57
Id. § 4331 (b).
58
Id. § 4331 (a).
59
Id.
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to hold resources “in trust” for those who will follow.60 It offers no blueprint or structure for how to do this.
Beyond NEPA, trust principles are even less prevalent in American
federal law.61 Indeed, in spite of the trust language in NEPA, some have
correctly observed that “the body of modern environmental law developed
largely without meaningful trust scrutiny.”62 Certainly, several other
instances can also be found in which federal environmental statutes
incorporate explicit trust terms. For example, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”)63 allows
for a trust mechanism for natural resources damages.64 Other federal
statutes speak to the importance of protecting common resources65 and
avoiding harm to future generations.66
In addition, state statutory law also references trust law.67 State
constitutions can often echo or reflect trust principles. By way of example, the State Constitution of Pennsylvania includes expansive trust
language when it states:
60

See id.
For example, in President Clinton’s Federal Action to Address Environmental Justice
in Minority and Low Income Populations, Executive Order 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629
1994), as amended by Executive Order 12948, 60 Fed. Reg. 6381 (1995), it was explicitly
stated that the order “is not intended to, nor does it create any right, benefit, or trust
responsibility. . . .” Id. § 6-609 (emphasis added).
62
Wood & Galpern, supra note 7, at 280.
63
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601.
64
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607 (f) (CERCLA § 107 (f)) states:
The President, or the authorized representative of any State, shall act
on behalf of the public as trustee of such natural resources to recover
for such damages. Sums recovered by the United States Government
as trustee under this subsection shall be retained by the trustee
without further appropriation, for use only to restore, replace, or
acquire the equivalence of such natural resources. Sums recovered by
a State as trustee under this subsection shall be available for use only
to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of such natural resources
by the State.
65
See, e.g., Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(1) [SWDA § 1002(b)(1)] (“Land
is too valuable a natural resource to be needlessly polluted”).
66
Id. § 6902(a)(5) [SWDA § 1003(a)(5)] (identifying as a goal “requiring that hazardous
waste be properly managed in the first instance thereby reducing the need for corrective
action at a future date”) and id. § 6902(b) [SWDA § 1003(b)] (declaring it to be national
policy that waste “should be treated, stored, or disposed of so as to minimize the present
and future threat to human health and the environment”).
67
See Fiduciary Obligation, supra note 7, at 103–26.
61
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The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and aesthetic
values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s natural resources
are the common property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the
Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the
benefit of all the people.68
However, meaningful incorporation of trust principles in environmental statutory law is still surprisingly limited in scope. Mere “compliance with a statutory scheme does not automatically ensure compliance
with trust standards.”69 A trust requires the most exacting concern for
beneficiaries.70 A statute merely mandates strict compliance with its
terms—along with the ability to argue for an interpretation of the statute
and its exceptions that is the most favorable to a particular party’s interest.71 In a regime in which the statutory and regulatory scope has
greatly increased, “the use of the PTD as a legal tool to fight broad-scale
environmental degradation has generally been overshadowed by reliance
on statutory and regulatory solutions.”72
It is natural to look first to the requirements of environmental
statutes to assess environmental compliance and to determine whether
a particular actor’s undertakings have met the standards set in the
voluminous trove of statutory law and the regulations that implement
them.73 Yet, as a conceptual matter, the public trust doctrine may be more
ambitious as a protective framework for the environment because, in
contrast to the statutory regime, trust doctrine “contains no permit shields,
no agricultural and silvicultural exemption, and no defense of compliance
with a federal label. It is an ancient body of law.”74 The public trust doctrine is less concerned with the minutiae of a regulatory system that may
be excruciatingly complex, expensive, and less directly focused on long
68

PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (emphasis added). For further discussion of the interplay between
the public trust doctrine and state statutes and constitutions, including that of Pennsylvania, see, e.g., Kanner, supra note 7, at 86–93; True History, supra note 7, at 26–31.
69
Wood & Galpern, supra note 7, at 296.
70
See id. at 302–04.
71
See id.
72
Turnipseed et al., supra note 7, at 7. See also id. (“Unfortunately, the copious environmental statutes and regulations enacted in the last 40 years have not proved to be uniformly
adept at preventing the degradation of ecosystems and ecosystem services.”).
73
See EPA, PROTOCOL FOR CONDUCTING ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AUDITS UNDER THE
COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY ACT (1998).
74
Reschly, supra note 7, at 10951.
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term preservation in the same straightforward way as the public trust
doctrine can be.75
In addition, the public trust doctrine offers an overarching theory
of environmental responsibility that can have important appeal in circumstances when statutes may be interpreted or enforced in different ways.
Often statutes and regulations require discretion in implementation or
enforcement. These individual decisions on particular matters may have
a cumulative impact that may go undetected.76 In her extensive writings
on public trust theory, Mary C. Wood argues that public trust law has a
particularly vital role to play in the situations in which statutes provide
discretion.77 In these particular circumstances, trust theory offers a coherent rationale for the ways in which discretion should be exercised if
it is to advance environmental obligations to other generations.78
It is also true that the modern development of environmental
law—both in the United States and internationally—is still very much
driven by media.79 That is, the siloing of water, land, air, species, and
ecosystem protection still characterizes much of the regulatory scheme.80
Thus, when future generations raise concerns about large scale problems,
the regulatory scheme may provide a disjointed and fragmented way to
address large scale, future concerns because it does not adequately weigh
the ramifications of the interplay between various parts of the natural
and man-made environments.81
Although beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth observing
that the public trust doctrine has also made its way into foreign statutes
and constitutions82 as a way of protecting environmental resources for
75

See id. at 10950.
See Fiduciary Obligation, supra note 7, at 103, 119.
77
See id. at 102–10.
78
See id. at 103–05.
79
See Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The Emergence of Global Environmental Law,
36 L.Q. 615, 645 (2009); Liz Bourguet, David Roberts: Climate Change, the Media, and
Shifting Political Power, YALE CTR. FOR ENV’T L. & POL’Y (Apr. 10, 2019), https://enviro
center.yale.edu/news/david-roberts-climate-change-media-and-shifting-political-power
[https://perma.cc/JT2C-JQ4G].
80
See Ecological Realism, supra note 7, at 56–57.
81
See id. at 55, 57.
82
See Wood & Galpern, supra note 7, at 304–06 (reviewing concept of public trust protection of natural resources in foreign law); No Ordinary Lawsuit, supra note 6, at 78–84
(discussing international law and foreign law with respect to protecting future generations
through a public trust theory). See generally Michael C. Blumm & Rachel D. Guthrie,
Internationalizing the Public Trust Doctrine: Natural Law and Constitutional and Statutory Approaches to Fulfilling the Saxion Vision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 741 (2012).
76
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future generations. Indeed, some have argued that the public trust doctrine has become customary international law because it articulates a
principle that is prevalent in many different legal systems.83 With respect
to international relations more broadly, there is increasing attention to
both intragenerational equity and intergenerational responsibility as
“the emerging concept of intragenerational equity [is] a significant element
in the debate on the international attainment of sustainable development.”84 Trust theory is a tangible expression of the way in which intergenerational equity can be fostered.85 Others have argued more broadly
for a “planetary trust”, which is a far more expansive view with respect
to using trust doctrine for environmental protection.86 While many international agreements concerning sustainability and intergenerational
obligations are still in the realm of so-called “soft” law,87 these international
agreements make it clear that, in theory at least, such intergenerational
obligations exist.88

83

Wood & Galpern, supra note 7, at 277.
Duncan A. French, International Environmental Law and the Achievement of Intragenerational Equity, 31 ENV’T L. REP. 10469 (2011). See also id. at 10477 (“Intergenerational
equity is the notion that the international community is under a moral, even possibly a
legal, obligation to protect and preserve the environment and its natural resources for
present and future generations. Whilst it is an overtly anthropocentric notion, intergenerational equity can, however, be interpreted within a broader ecological context.”).
85
See French, supra note 84, at 10479.
86
For further discussion of the planetary trust concept, see Slobodian, supra note 9, at 582:
Under the planetary trust model, each generation as a whole and all of
its members act as both custodian and beneficiary of the trust. Under
the public trust doctrine, a specific government has an obligation to
manage trust resources for the benefit of its citizens. . . . [T]he public
trust doctrine applies only to public resources within the relevant
government’s jurisdiction. However, the idea of a fiduciary duty to
protect the resources of the earth for its future inhabitants is shared by
both models and is a strong mechanism for championing the rights of
future generations.
Id.
87
See id. at 10480 (“[T]he international legal community has not yet been convinced of
the advantages of adopting such a radical new approach. . . . [T]here are still too many
issues left unresolved as to what intergenerational equity actually means for it to have
any real substantive impact on international law. Intergenerational equity will therefore
remain a useful philosophical and political argument for advancing the case of environmental protection. . . .”); Slobodian, supra note 9, at 573 (noting that, with respect to
intergenerational obligation “[i]t is not clear whether this body of law and practice adds
up to an internationally accepted, legally binding obligation.”).
88
For further discussion of the role of intergenerational obligations in international
instruments, see generally French, supra note 84, at 10478–79.
84
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Efforts to Expand the Public Trust Doctrine

In the private property context, the trust is the legal vehicle
through which trustees ensure that the often-finite assets of the trust are
wisely managed to protect both present and future beneficiaries.89 This
accounts for much of the appeal of this doctrine as a traditional way to
meet obligations to both future generations and contemporary beneficiaries.90 The obligation of intergenerational solidarity is baked into the
heart of trust theory.
Hence, as concern for future generations becomes increasingly
urgent, there is a corresponding urge to explore the ways in which an
expanded view of the trust concept may foster our obligations to future
generations.91 This effort is understandable given the intersection of
several emerging realities:
•

•

•

•

89

The obligation to future generations—and our own
link to past generations—is becoming ever clearer
as our knowledge of ecology grows.92
Environmental statutes mention trust obligations
in passing but have never developed the concept in
any meaningful way.93
Even if complete compliance with the dizzying array
of environmental statutes was possible, there could
still be environmental harms that would impact
future generations because of cumulative impacts,
inconsistencies between regulatory obligations, failure to recognize the cross-media impacts of various
forms of pollution, etc.94
Trust theory seems to hold the promise of using a
traditional doctrine to safeguard the interests of
future generations in a more holistic, fiduciary way.

See, e.g., Trust, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
Id.
91
Mary Christina Wood has been one of the most prolific writers on this theory. Her work
on developing the expansive notion of “Nature’s Trust” can be found in MARY CHRISTINA
WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A NEW ECOLOGICAL AGE (2014). For
a critical view of such efforts to expand the public trust doctrine in this way, see generally
Speaking of Inconvenient Truths, supra note 33, passim.
92
See Ecological Realism, supra note 7, at 76, 89.
93
See Pace, supra note 6, at 98.
94
See Ecological Realism, supra note 7, at 43–44.
90
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Juliana v. United States offers an unfolding example of an effort
to expand the scope of the trust theory to protect the ecological interests
of future generations.95 As part of the Atmospheric Trust Litigation
movement,96 this case is but one example of a growing initiative seeking
to “invoke [] the judiciary to act as the vehicle to mitigate common pool
resource deterioration in the face of climate change.”97
There were a number of theories asserted by the young Juliana
plaintiffs, but the trust argument is of particular interest for this Article.98
To adopt this line of reasoning would significantly expand the concept of
the public trust doctrine beyond its traditional use to safeguard specific
assets.99 It would, if successful, create a far more expansive and complex
fiduciary obligation to protect the atmosphere from degradation.100
In an order denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment in the Juliana case,101 Judge Ann Aiken of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Oregon allowed the case to move forward. Her discussion of the merits of the case was favorable to an expanded view of the
public trust doctrine.102 Her opinion determined that a prior finding that
“the public trust doctrine is deeply rooted in our nation’s history”103 was
not clearly erroneous. Thus, Judge Aiken let stand the prior ruling that

95

In making their argument, “the children are demanding that the government be held
liable, as fiduciaries, to maintain an atmosphere free of substantial impairment.” Pace,
supra note 6, at 86. See, e.g., OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST SUBMISSION
TO THE UNITED NATION’S SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON CULTURAL RIGHTS AND CLIMATE
CHANGE (May 2020).
96
See No Ordinary Lawsuit, supra note 6, at 21–24 (outlining basic principles of the
Atmospheric Trust Litigation cases).
97
Pace, supra note 6, at 87.
98
See id. at 95.
99
See id. at 95–96.
100
See, e.g., id. at 89:
[T]he children demanded that . . . the atmosphere must be recognized
as an essential component of the public trust assets. . . . That is, the
children claimed that the federal government owes, as fiduciaries,
active maintenance of the atmospheric system to sustain it for present
and future generation beneficiaries. . . . [T]he children sought a judicial
order declaring a fundamental right to children and future generations
to a stable and healthy climate system, which the United States must
actively address and protect via public trust obligations.
Id.
101
Juliana v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1062 (D. Or. 2018).
102
For commentary on Judge Aiken’s opinion in Juliana, see, e.g., Pace, supra note 6, at
95–100; Berliner, supra note 6, passim; No Ordinary Lawsuit, supra note 6, passim.
103
Juliana, 339 F. Supp. 3d at 1102.
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the plaintiffs should have the opportunity to argue for the public trust
doctrine’s applicability on the merits.104
When the case was appealed, Judge Aiken’s decision was reversed
by a Ninth Circuit decision that seemed deeply sympathetic to the arguments of the plaintiffs but unwilling to use the courts to remedy their
grievances.105 In his opinion, Judge Andrew Hurwitz acknowledged such
things as “[t]he record leaves little basis for denying that climate change
is occurring at an increasingly rapid pace,”106 “the federal government has
long understood the risks of fossil fuel use,”107 “the government’s contribution to climate change is not simply a result of inaction,”108 “the causal
chain is sufficiently established,”109 and “[p]laintiffs have made a compelling case that action is needed.”110 These statements, viewed individually
and, more compellingly, as a whole, suggest on the merits a sympathetic
perspective on the young plaintiffs’ substantive complaint.111
However, the court identified the nature of the remedy sought by
the plaintiffs as one that did not belong to the judiciary but to the political branches. The remedy sought would require “an injunction requiring
the government not only to cease permitting, authorizing, and subsidizing fossil fuel use, but also to prepare a plan subject to judicial approval
to draw down harmful emissions.”112 The court was concerned about
separation of powers, as well, believing that “plaintiffs thus seek not only
to enjoin the Executive from exercising discretionary authority expressly
granted by Congress . . . but also to enjoin Congress from exercising
power expressly granted by the Constitution over public lands.”113
Thus, the court—with apparent reluctance on the merits of the
claim—sent the plaintiffs back to the political branches for any potential
remedy.114 The court believed that the relief sought would require decisions
that fall within the province of the political branches.115 It concluded that

104

Id. at 1063.
Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
106
Id. at 1166.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 1167.
109
Id. at 1169.
110
Id. at 1175.
111
Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1175.
112
Id. at 1170.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 1175.
115
Id. at 1171 (“[A]ny effective plan would necessarily require a host of complex policy
decisions entrusted, for better or worse, to the wisdom and discretion of the executive
and legislative branches.”); id. at 1172 (“[P]laintiff’s request for a remedial plan would
105
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“some questions—even those existential in nature—are the province of
the political branches.”116
The dissenting opinion, by Judge Josephine Stanton took a broader
view of the court’s ability to grant relief.117 She likened this to other
complex cases in which courts were called on to resolve complicated questions requiring judicial supervision and oversight.118
The Juliana plaintiffs have since petitioned the Ninth Circuit for
a rehearing en banc in a continued effort to advance the claims of future
generations to the preservation of ecological resources.119 Regardless of
how this litigation, and other cases like it, are ultimately resolved, it
illustrates the tension between the desire to protect future generations
and the inherent limitations of both the trust doctrine and the political
process as the vehicles to do so. It seems to be a mere matter of time before
other circuits, and perhaps the Supreme Court itself, weigh in on the
appropriate scope of the public trust doctrine to safeguard future generations from broadly defined environmental harms.
III.

PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES WITH THE TRUST PARADIGM

There is great appeal in embracing the concept of a trust as a
vehicle not merely to express our obligations to future generations but to
subsequently require the judiciary to pass judgment on the sufficiency of the government’s response . . . which necessarily would entail a broad range of policymaking.”); and
id. (“[G]iven the complexity and long-lasting nature of global climate change, the court
would be required to supervise the government’s compliance with any suggested plan for
many decades.”). For a more modest view of what this responsibility would entail, see
Effective Judicial Intervention, supra note 7, at 509 (“[P]ublic trust law is not so much
a substantive set of standards for dealing with the public domain as it is a technique by
which courts may mend perceived imperfections in the legislative and administrative
process.”); id. at 521 (“The ‘public trust’ has no life of its own and no intrinsic content. It
is no more—and no less—than a name courts give to their concerns about the insufficiencies of the democratic process.”); and id. at 558 (“It is virtually unheard of for a court
to rule that a policy is illegal because it is unwise. . . . Rather, they may effectively overrule
a questionable policy decision by requiring that the appropriate agency provide further
justification; alternatively, the courts may, in effect, remand the matter for additional
consideration in the political sphere.”).
116
Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1173.
117
See id. at 1175–76 (Stanton, dissenting).
118
See id. at 1176 (Stanton, dissenting).
119
See Petition for Rehearing En Banc of Plaintiffs-Appellees, Juliana v. United States,
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Case No. 18-36082 (March 2, 2020)
[hereinafter Petition for Rehearing En Banc] and Appellant’s Opposition to Petition for
Rehearing En Banc, Juliana v. United States, United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, Case No. 18-36082 (March 24, 2020).
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implement them in the realm of law and policy.120 This doctrine also has
a deep moral attraction as a way to bind generations to each other as they
negotiate the fragile care of the natural world entrusted to all.121 There
is something inherent in the notion of fiduciary obligations that is an
eloquent reminder of how important faithful stewardship can be. Indeed,
beyond the legal ramifications of the public trust doctrine, the trust theme
also has a theological and philosophical mandate as well.122
Yet, in spite of its conceptual and ethical attraction, an overly broad
reading of the public trust doctrine would, by definition, expand the scope
of this theory beyond traditional roots without clear limitations or guidance.123 There are limitations inherent in the concept of the trust as an
120

Other models have also been proposed. See SCI. & ENV’T HEALTH NETWORK, MODELS
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS (The International
Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School) (October 2008) (proposing ombudsman and
guardianships).
121
This was expressed eloquently in Araiza, supra note 7, at 695 (observing that the
public trust doctrine “strikes a deeply resonant chord with Americans, given our national
narrative about the common heritage of our nation’s natural beauty and abundance.”).
122
See Environmental History Brief, supra note 33, at 13 (“Grounded in Christian
theology, expressed in republican virtue, and later underscored by the findings of modern
ecological science, the idea of organic unity and intergenerational responsibility—in particular responsibility to future generations—became one of the great organizing principles
of the American Republic.”). See also Brief of Amici Curiae Eco-Justice Ministries et al.,
in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Brief in Juliana v. United States on appeal from the
United States District Court for the District of Oregon, No. 18-36082 (arguing, from a
variety of religious perspectives, on behalf of protecting future generations); Anthony L.
I. Moffa, Wasting the Planet: What a Storied Doctrine of Property Brings to Bear on Environmental Law and Climate Change, 27 J. ENV’T L. & LITIG. 459, 465 (2012) (“[S]ome semblance
of regard for future generations exists at the core of the moral teachings of a preponderance
of the world’s major religions.”). I have also written extensively about the role of environmental stewardship in the Judeo-Christian context, particularly in the Catholic tradition.
See generally LUCIA A. SILECCHIA, The Call to Stewardship: A Catholic Perspective on
Environmental Responsibility, in AMERICAN LAW FROM A CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVE: THROUGH
A CLEARER LENS (Ronald J. Rychlak ed., 2015); Lucia A. Silecchia, Environmental Ethics
from the Perspective of NEPA and Catholic Social Teaching: Ecological Guidance for the
21st Century, 28 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 659 (2004); Lucia A. Silecchia, Discerning the Environmental Perspective of Pope Benedict XVI, 4 J. CATHOLIC SOC. THOUGHT
227 (2007); Lucia A. Silecchia, The “Preferential Option for the Poor”: An Opportunity and
a Challenge for Environmental Decision Making, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 87 (2008); Lucia
A. Silecchia, “Social Love” as a Vision for Environmental Law: Laudato Si’ and the Rule of
Law, 10 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 371 (2016); Lucia A. Silecchia, Conflicts and Laudato Si’: Ten
Principles for Environmental Dispute Resolution, 33 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 61 (2017).
123
The appeal of this argument for expansion lay at the core of the landmark Liberating
the Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 7. However, many also sound a cautious note about
such an expansion. See, e.g., Huffman, supra note 10, at 340 (noting that an expansion
FOR
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effective doctrine for bringing meaningful ethical principles to bear on
the ways in which the world is held for those to come.124 While certainly
not the only example, cases like Juliana bring brought these limitations
to the forefront.125 Although not entirely insurmountable, these difficulties become more obvious when contrasting the public trust with the
more traditional private trust.
First, the traditional public trust doctrine evolved when the primary focus was on protecting particular discrete assets for future uses.126
In its ancient origins, the public trust doctrine was limited to specific
assets with a clearly understood necessity for the common good.127 Traditionally, this was seen in the prominence paid to waterways and preserving bodies of water.128 This was particularly true for those with utility as
navigable waterways.129
More recently, the establishment of national parks, the protection
of specific endangered species, and initiatives to clean up and restore
of the doctrine “would require the courts to exceed both their traditional and their constitutional powers and to make up a lot of law while treading on the vested rights of a lot
of people”); Kanner, supra note 7, at 82 (observing that “courts continue to expand the
number of resources held under the public trust. The trust rights in a particular resource
tend to increase over time.”); Araiza, supra note 7, at 696 (noting that “when scholars
argue in favor of broadening the doctrine’s limitation beyond its traditional focus on
aquatic resources, critics can readily criticize them for embracing a judicial role for which
courts have neither the legal authority not the expertise, and for seeking a doctrinal
expansion that neither legal precedent nor sound policy supports”).
124
For a stronger statement of his point, see Huffman, supra note 10, at 341 (“Good
intentions, even asserted moral imperatives, do not outweigh the risks to liberty and the
public good inherent in judicial lawmaking.”). For a careful assessment of the basic
questions to be answered in advancing the public trust doctrine as a useful paradigm, see
Frank, supra note 7, at 671 (identifying four fundamental questions such as determining
the res, resolving federalism questions, reconciling the trust concept with other doctrines,
and identification of the doctrine’s source as necessary for advancing trust theory).
125
See generally Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
126
Because of this, in the view of some commentators, the public “trust” functioned more
like a public “easement.” See, e.g., Fish Out of Water, supra note 7, at 533 (“[T]he public
trust doctrine should be analyzed as a simple easement rather than as part of trusts,
administrative, constitutional, or police power law. . . . By misconceiving the doctrine, our
modern courts have confused the concepts of public rights, police power, and constitutional rights.”).
127
See Wood & Galpern, supra note 7, at 273 (stating that the public trust doctrine “defines
vital natural resources as quantifiable assets that the government must manage for the
long term interests of the public”). For additional background on the history of the public
trust doctrine from various perspectives, see, e.g., Huffman, supra note 10, at 343–49.
128
See generally Wilkinson, supra note 33, at 426–31.
129
See generally id. (exploring the importance of the public trust doctrine for preserving
access to navigable and other water bodies in American legal history).
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parcels of environmentally damaged land offer examples of ways in which
using trust principles to protect specific environmental assets may come
into play in effective ways.130 This mirrors the way in which a traditional
private trust is designed to manage, protect or invest specific assets or
a well-defined res.131
However, the trust doctrine is harder to apply when the specific
assets—the res—of the trust are not easy to identify. As our understanding of the interconnectedness of the natural world has grown, the ability
to limit or define the assets to be protected in a coherent way is unrealistic.132 Indeed, any “trust approach that cherry-picks specific assets for
protection and ignores the reality of interrelationships is likely to perpetuate the failings of natural resources law.”133 As knowledge about ecology
grows, it is becoming increasingly clear that all parts of the natural and
built worlds are closely intertwined in such a way that makes identifying
specific trust assets far harder than the well-intentioned protectors of
rivers and waterways would have thought centuries ago.134 Protecting
such broad interests as sustainability, or a healthy atmosphere, or a
specific carbon footprint require a far broader understanding of which
assets may be held in trust.135
Yet, increasing the flexibility or broadening the way in which a trust
res is identified is also unrealistic and, in many ways, highly undesirable
even if the intended goal is admirable. Frequently changing and reassessing the holdings or res of the trust adds an element of unpredictability to
130

See Torres & Bellinger, supra note 7, at 287–88 (discussing the expansion in understanding what might legitimately constitute the res of the public trust doctrine). See also
Ralph W. Johnson & William C. Galloway, Protection of Biodiversity Under the Public
Trust Doctrine, 8 TUL. ENV’T L.J. 21 (1994) (arguing in favor of expanding public trust
theory to advance species protection and biodiversity).
131
See Ecological Realism, supra note 7, at 67.
132
See Wood & Galpern, supra note 7 (“[C]leaving any category of resource from the trust
endowment leaves it open to destruction.”). See also id. at 283–86 (arguing for an expansive definition of the res of a public trust); Takacs, supra note 7, at 718–20 (noting the
gradual expansion in the theory as to what might constitute the terms of a public trust);
No Ordinary Lawsuit, supra note 6, at 23 (arguing that “the air and atmosphere, along
with other vital natural resources, are within the res of the public trust.”).
133
Ecological Realism, supra note 7, at 83.
134
See, e.g., Craig Anthony Arnold & Lance H. Gunderson, Adaptive Law and Resilience,
43 ENV’T L. REV. 10426 (2013) (noting the dichotomy that while “[a]ccording to resilience
science, interconnected ecological and social systems are dynamic, complex, and subject
to abrupt and unpredictable change, . . . environmental law’s foundations assume that
nature is relatively stable, changing primarily in linear patterns within a range of predictable conditions.”).
135
Johnson & Galloway, supra note 130, at 31–32.
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the enterprise. This is unpalatable for different reasons including lack
of certainty, blurred boundaries between private and public interests, and
the constant need to debate the contours of public assets and private
property rights in an inefficient way.136
Relatedly, a traditional private trust is created with a (hopefully!)
clear statement by a settlor as to what the settlor demanded with respect
to the management of the res by the trustees.137 At the same time, a wellwritten trust agreement will include some rational way to allow appropriate flexibility in the management of the trust if new information
becomes available or assumptions change.138 While recognizing the value
of stability, a well drafted trust agreement builds in principled standards
for controlled flexibility.139 The public trust doctrine in its current form
does not seem well-suited to this delicate balance. The terms of the trust
are not entirely clear.140 Because of this initial ambiguity, it can be difficult to introduce flexibility in a way that is not subject to political whims
or expensive, inefficient lobbying or litigation.141
Third, in most trusts—public and private—there is often some
irreconcilable and inherent conflict between the needs or desires of different classes of beneficiaries, particularly if they are of different generations
or ages.142 Weighing the interests of past, present and future generations
is an art, not a precise science. Trustees are bound to a duty of impartiality such that they do not unduly favor some classes of beneficiaries over
136

See Huffman, supra note 10, at 364–65 (critiquing expansive view of res in the public
trust).
137
See Jonathan R. Macey, Private Trusts for the Provision of Private Goods, 37 EMORY
L.J. 300–01 (1988).
138
See id. at 296.
139
See, e g., Arnold & Gunderson, supra note 134, at 10427 (“[L]aw is brittle and maladaptive if it assumes and reinforces a static state that does not match ecological or social
change.”). This raises a particular difficulty because the ever changing nature of our
ecological knowledge challenges the importance of predictability in law. See Liberating
the Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 7, at 186–87 (noting that “[t]he essence of property
law is respect for reasonable expectations. The idea of justice at the root of private property protection calls for identification of those expectations which the legal system ought
to recognize.”).
140
Some have argued that, at least in the broadest of strokes, the terms of the trust can
be identified. See Torres & Bellinger, supra note 7, at 284 (stating simply that “[t]he
public trust doctrine instructs our government to protect and preserve for both present
and future generations the right of all citizens to enjoy natural resources free from substantial impairment or depletion.”).
141
See Torres & Bellinger, supra note 7, at 311–12.
142
See generally Wood & Galpern, supra note 7, at 283 (referencing “irreconcilably
conflicting beneficiary interests”).
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others.143 Fortunately, a well-planned trust agreement will offer guidance
as to the settlor’s wishes with respect to how these interests should be
reconciled or mediated when they arise.144 In contrast, in the environmental context of a public trust, there is no clear guidance as to how
respect for the past, the needs of the present, and the demands of the
future should be balanced when there is inevitable conflict—perceived or
real—between them.
Fourth, and closely related, a typical trust includes standards by
which the fidelity of the trustees can be measured.145 However, in a
project as complex as environmental regulation—with long- and shortterm impacts that are often unknown—this may be difficult to assess.146
This is a problem in trusts of all kinds,147 but the specific nature of an
environmentally oriented trust concept raises unique difficulties. In the
context of developing an adaptive model for environmental regulation it
was noted:
“Dead” approaches can be “resurrected” when the conditions are right, and alternate approaches can stimulate a
seemingly failed approach to respond adaptively and become successful. One of the most challenging aspects of
developing a legal system that both requires adaptation to
changed conditions and allows for systems to evolve over
time is that a primary function of the legal system is accountability. . . . Defining the standards and boundaries to
which people and entities will be held accountable can
143

J.C. Phillips, Some Instances of the Trustee’s Duty to Act Fairly Between Different
Classes of Beneficiaries, 10 U. QUEENSLAND L.J., 83 (1977).
144
See Thomas P. Gallanis, The New Direction of American Trust Law, 97 IOWA L. REV.
215, 223 (2011).
145
See Phillips, supra note 143, at 89–90.
146
For a further discussion of some of these practical difficulties, see Wood & Galpern,
supra note 7, at 282–84. But see Ryan et al., supra note 6, at 38 (arguing that in the
public trust context, “what we’re dealing with is just basic asset management, and that
management is covered by fiduciary obligations of protection. So when we look at the
atmosphere, we do have definable scientific standards . . . [T]he public trust claim is
discernible because it has these standards.”) (quoting Mary Wood).
147
See Macey, supra note 137, at 298 (“Perhaps the most obvious question is whether the
initial premise, that conditions often change in ways unforeseeable by the settlor, is
necessarily correct. Put another way, the question becomes whether the transaction costs
of writing a trust instrument that specifies all conceivable future contingencies are truly
infinite. Even if the answer to the question is yes, it is interesting to wonder: At what
point does it become inefficient to plan for the unexpected?”).
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have significant impact on the resilience of ecosystems,
social systems, and legal systems.148
Compounding this difficulty is the fact that the application of
traditional fiduciary duties is not as clear in the environmental context
as in a traditional trust.149 Even if the nature of the res, the terms of the
trust, and the needs of all beneficiaries were entirely clear, it is not clear
how the “trustee” of the trust should understand and then comply with
such duties as loyalty and care.
Fifth, in the environmental law arena there is a lack of clarity as
to who the “settlor” of the trust originally was.150 Perhaps it is not necessary to answer this question. If preserving natural resources “in trust”
is, as commentators have suggested, an “ancient and enduring”151 principle, then this may not be a critically important question to answer. From
a philosophical or theological perspective, the answer for many would be
that the settlor of the trust is divine.152 More narrowly, if the public trust
doctrine is considered to be “rooted in the original social compact that
citizens make with their governments,”153 then the settlor would be the
original citizenry. Indeed, there is a steadily growing body of scholarly
literature arguing that the public trust doctrine is an important part of
constitutional law.154 Peter H. Sand asked this critically important question in context when he inquired:

148

Arnold & Gunderson, supra note 134, at 10441.
See generally Wood & Galpern, supra note 7, at 289–97 (detailing the application of
traditional trust fiduciary principles in the context of the public trust doctrine for natural
resources).
150
Indeed, one commentator called the assets protected by the public trust doctrine to be
“gifts of nature.” Takacs, supra note 7, at 718. If this is the case, then a reference in some
manner to a divine author would seem to be necessary—and, yet, that would be difficult
or impossible to translate into a legal theory. See Huffman, supra note 10, at 368 (“[W]e
will search in vain for a creator who, under trusts law, cannot be either the trustee or the
beneficiary. Without a creator we cannot know the terms of the trust.”); Fish Out of
Water, supra note 7, at 535 (noting the lack of the creator or settlor of a public trust and
noting, correctly, that “the trust as a relationship between parties holding legal and
equitable title can only be understood with references to the purposes of the creator”).
151
Wood & Galpern, supra note 7, at 272.
152
Fish Out of Water, supra note 7, at 542 (“[A]dvocates of the modern public trust doctrine might be pleased if the courts would look to God, or Mother Nature, or the natural
law as the creator of the trust.”).
153
Wood & Galpern, supra note 7, at 274.
154
See generally Wood & Galpern, supra note 7, at 273–77; Torres & Bellinger, supra note
7, at 288–29 (describing the public trust as something that preexisted the Constitution).
149
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To the extent that fiduciary metaphors . . . are used in a
legal sense (rather than as sheer rhetoric, which is often
the case!), they all express the common “altruistic” concept
of agency, or, acting on behalf and for the benefit of another. What seems to distinguish public trusteeship from
the rest of the existence of a “settlor” who creates the trust?
The question in the case of public trusteeship is who is the
settlor? Presumably it is the community . . . that designates
governmental authorities as public trustees to manage the
corpus (the body) of the trust for the benefit of “the people”
(including the yet-unborn beneficiaries of an intergenerational trust), and which then empowers the beneficiaries
to enforce the terms of the trust against the trustees.155
In the American legal system, the identity of the “settlor” has the
added complexity created by a federal system: is the settlor—the original
“owner”—of the resources placed in trust, the federal government or the
government of the state or states in which the resource is located? Is it
the federal government who created the trust when lands were conveyed
for the creation of new states? This, too, has been the subject of legal
debate and academic commentary.156 Is a system of multiple state level
trustees efficient or effective when the public trust doctrine is evoked to
protect not only specific assets but broader environmental goods that
cannot be contained within the geographic boundaries of a single state?157
With a lack of clarity as to the settlor, there are thorny questions that
can arise when the presumed desires of the unidentified settlors seem to
conflict with the demands of at least some of the beneficiaries.158

155

Turnipseed et al., supra note 7, at 8.
See Wilkinson, supra note 33, at 439 (observing that “In the United States . . . there
were two potential owners, the United States and the state within which the navigable
watercourse was located. The matter of ownership was not so pressing in the original
thirteen states, where lands within state boundaries never passed o the United States;
the colonies, now states, held title to lands within their borders before the union was
formed and they retained ownership to those lands afterwards. The situation was different, however, with respect to the western lands that the United States obtained through
treaties.”). See also Fish Out of Water, supra note 7, at 539–44 (addressing complexities
of identifying the settlor of the public trust).
157
See Berliner, supra note 6, at 354 (“The effects of climate change do not stop at state
borders, so why should the obligations under the PTD?”).
158
This problem is discussed more fully in Thomas Gallanis, The New Directions of
American Trust Law, 97 IOWA L. REV. 215 (2011). He asks, “whose wishes about the administration of the trust are paramount: the settlor who established the trust and specified
156
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Sixth, there is still another difficulty with the “cast of characters”
question.159 There is uncertainty as to who the trustees of the trust are
in the context of environmental protection. In the broadest sense, it can
be said that all of the living are to act as trustees for those who will come.
It states the obvious to note that all the living can, for good or for evil,
impact the environment. From a moral perspective, this broad responsibility seems to be the optimal approach—and the one that is most accurate.
The language of NEPA discussed above broadly references the “responsibility of each generation to be a trustee160 supporting a view that, as a
moral matter, this obligation is broadly shared.” However, in a legal sense
it is harder to determine who is to serve in the role of trustee.161
It seems most logical that the trustee at any given time is the
legislature. This branch is most closely responsive to the citizenry, and
“[t]he legislature stands accountable to the people as trustee. . . . Agencies within the executive branch act as authorized agents of the trustee
and must meet fiduciary standards as well.”162 On the federal level, “the
trust approach would hold Congress accountable, at least in the court of
public opinion, as the ultimate trustee with a duty to act.”163 In addition,
there may be circumstances in which the jurisdictional nature of government authority over and impact on resources—particularly those that
cross boundaries—is in the nature of a co-trusteeship between federal
and state authorities, and between national and international authorities.164 This would involve multiple legislatures as co-trustees. There is
also an argument—in my view, less convincing—that the judicial branch
serves in the role of trustee because it can review the deeds of other
the terms of its governance in the trust instrument, or the beneficiaries, who are the
equitable owners of the trust assets.” Id. at 218.
159
See id. at 230.
160
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 101(b), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970).
161
See Weston, supra note 9, at 376 (“At a minimum, each of us has a moral responsibility
to ensure that today’s children and future generations inherit a global environment at
least no worse than the one we received from our predecessors. . . . When this responsibility-towards-future-generations axiom is considered from a legal perspective, however,
it emerges less obvious.”).
162
Wood & Galpern, supra note 7, at 278. See also Ecological Realism, supra note 7, at
75 (“The legislature is the trustee of the assets in its role as primary governing branch
of the sovereign. The executive branch is by nature an ‘agent’ of the legislature. . . .
[A]gencies are agents of the trustee, encumbered with the duty to carry out sovereign
trust obligations.”); and No Ordinary Lawsuit, supra note 6, at 23 (positing that “the
legislature and its implementing legislature are public trustees”).
163
Fiduciary Obligation, supra note 7, at 135.
164
See Wood & Galpern, supra note 7, at 287–89 (discussing “sovereign co-trusteeship”
relationships on both the domestic and international level).

2021]

A “DIRECTED TRUST” APPROACH

405

actors to determine if they are compatible with protecting the needs of
the beneficiaries.165
It is also important, in any trust, to avoid too much overlap in
identity between the settlor, beneficiaries, and trustees. This is prohibited in the law of private trusts, which requires that these parties be
distinct.166 Although a single actor may wear more than one hat, he or
she may not be the sole person in all of these roles.167 By analogy, in the
environmental context, “the state” or “the people” should not be the sole
settlor, trustee and beneficiary.168
It is also unclear what the “terms” of the trust agreement are.169
This may be part of natural law which predates government.170 If that is
the case, there would be no need for any express statement of the terms.
Indeed, “the existence of a constitutional trust does not depend on the
formulation of express constitutional public trust provisions. . . . [T]hese
expressions do not create a new constitutional right but rather articulate
the pre-existing, inherent property rights held by the government and
reserved by the people when forming their government.”171 Certainly, at
a minimum, the terms of any environmental trust should include a duty
to prevent waste.172 However, there is much else about the particular
terms of the trust that are unclear. This can be problematic. The expansion of the trust doctrine, without clear guidelines or standards of care
introduces uncertainty at best and impermissible overreach at worst, no
matter how noble the motives. If the terms of the trust were merely to
protect known, specific assets for the benefit of the present and future

165

See id. at 279–80.
See Macey, supra note 137, at 295–96 n.2 (citing G. KEETON & L. SHERIDAN, THE LAW
OF TRUSTS 18–32 (10th ed. 1974)).
167
Fish Out of Water, supra note 7, at 543.
168
This problem is also addressed in Fish Out of Water, supra note 7, at 543–45.
169
See Wilkinson, supra note 33, at 459 (noting the complexity of determining “whether
the substantive standards for administering the trust are defined by state or federal law”
or whether it is a complex, interconnected scheme incorporating both). But see Fiduciary
Obligation, supra note 7, at 111–12 (arguing that defining the obligations and terms of
the trust “should not be overwhelming to judges. Public trust law, as developed over two
centuries, encompasses scores of individual cases”).
170
See generally Smith & Sweeney, supra note 7, at 327 (noting it is “important that
legislatures utilizing the public trust doctrine do so within a set of principled limits”).
171
Wood & Galpern, supra note 7, at 276. See also id. at 277–78.
172
This is elaborated on more fully in Fiduciary Obligation, supra note 7, at 95. See also
No Ordinary Lawsuit, supra note 6, at 23 (stating that in the public trust context, the trustees owe the beneficiaries “protection against ‘substantial impairment’ of the air, atmosphere, and climate system, which amounts to an affirmative duty to restore its balance”).
166
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public it is easier to divine the terms of the trust from past practice and
established custom. This becomes far more difficult if and when the goals
of the public trust are expanded to include broader goals of environmental and ecosystem protection rather than preservation of specific assets.173
Once the terms of the public trust are expanded this way, it could
rightly be said that there is a danger of a “voracious appetite of the
contemporary public trust doctrine.”174 This appetite is hard to control
without clear terms for the public trust that offer guidance as to what
assets should and could be protected—and how.175
Finally, as demonstrated by Juliana, it is still not clear whether
the public trust doctrine can be invoked on the federal level in any
expansive way or where it remains primarily the province of the states.176
That debate is beyond the realm of this Article. In part, this is because
others have discussed this debate in far more detail.177 More importantly,
even if cases were to begin holding that there is a federal public trust for
the environment, and even if that claim could be asserted beyond the
traditional confines of specific assets, and even if the trust could be
asserted on behalf of future generations, the practical benefits of such a
victory would be more limited than they may appear.
A finding by a court that the public trust doctrine exists in this
context would likely result in a declaratory judgement as to whether and
how the political branches had satisfied the terms of the trust.178 If the
court found that they had not done so, then the political branches would
be directed to develop a plan to remedy this breach.179 This would require
173

Indeed, one expression of the breadth that this could entail is found in Byrne, supra
note 7, at 915, where the author argues that the public trust doctrine “should provide a
basis to overcome regulatory takings limitations on environmental regulation.” Such a
broad reading would run into dangerous and direct conflict with the requirements of the
takings clause and the requirements of just compensation.
174
Smith & Sweeney, supra note 7, at 333.
175
This fear was expressed in more urgent terms in Fish Out of Water, supra note 7, at
567 (“The trust concept contradicts democratic theory by separating the state, as trustee,
from the public, as beneficiary, as if they are two distinct entities. The constitutional
rights concept invites the creation of new rights at the expense of existing rights—
environmental rights at the expense of property rights.”).
176
See No Ordinary Lawsuit, supra note 6, at 50.
177
See generally id. at 49–51 (arguing in favor of a federal public trust doctrine); Torres
& Bellinger, supra note 7, at 294–97 (arguing in favor of a federal public trust doctrine).
178
See No Ordinary Lawsuit, supra note 6, at 68.
179
For fuller discussion of the plan that would be required, see generally id. at 64–65, 68
(“public trust cases call on the judiciary to evaluate the performance of other branches
of government in fulfilling the fiduciary obligations they owe to the people”).
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extensive court supervision.180 This is the point at which the limitations
of the traditional trust paradigm seem most obvious.
This would require that courts engage in close supervision of the
political branches, both “requiring a plan that includes measurable steps”181
and “continued oversight to ensure proper execution.”182 The judiciary is
not the expert in determining what might effectively satisfy the trust obligations in the absence of clarity regarding so many elements of the
trust.183 The political branches may, for complex reasons and political
pressures, be unable or unwilling to take the broader view necessary to
accomplish this task as trustees.184 The fact that they were found to have
violated a fiduciary obligation to begin with may not necessarily indicate
an inability to meet those obligations. But, it may indicate unwillingness,
lack of resources, or genuine uncertainty as to the best way forward on
complex matters. A judicial declaration that there is a broad public trust
would still require someone to determine what the limits of the res in the
trust are; how the trustee failed to protect the res; what must be done to
protect the res; and how to monitor that all this had been accomplished.185
The political branches and the courts have inherent limitations on their
ability to do this well.186
Because of this, a modest proposal to introduce the concept of a
“directed trust” approach to environmental law and policy might be a
useful way to develop better protection for future generations regardless
of whether or not federal courts expand the public trust doctrine in the
ways sought by plaintiffs in cases such as Juliana.187
180

This was explained in id. at 24 (indicating that the Atmospheric Trust Litigation
“anticipates long-term implementation of climate recovery plans under continuing court
supervision”). However, it is also argued that this is a role that courts have already
played in other legal contexts. See id. at 71–72; and Petition for Rehearing En Banc,
supra note 119, at 3–4 (speaking of the similarity of the remedy sought here to “decades
of remedial plans like those ordered and overseen by various circuits to enforce the
declaratory judgment of Brown v. Board of Education” and noting that “systems of
segregation were no less complex to remedy than the government system of promoting
fossil fuels”).
181
No Ordinary Lawsuit, supra note 6, at 72.
182
Id.
183
Indeed, this can generate “anxiety about judicial policy-making on technically complex
and socially important issues.” Araiza, supra note 7, at 697.
184
See id. at 733–34.
185
The expansion of the public trust doctrine would “empower[] the courts to mandate
actions by the executive and legislative branches of government, even when those branches
have chosen not to act.” True History, supra note 7, at 16.
186
See Araiza, supra note 7, at 696–97.
187
See No Ordinary Lawsuit, supra note 6, at 22–23.
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TOWARD A “DIRECTED TRUST” APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY

Certainly, a “public trust” is not, and never has been of the same
nature as a private trust established to manage private property.188 Thus,
perhaps one response to the weaknesses outlined above is to acknowledge
that the analogy is an imperfect one and that it is unwise to try to “shoehorn” any critique of the public trust doctrine into the framework of a
private trust. This would require a simple concession that the term
“trust” means radically different things in the public and private contexts
and that analogizing the two uses of the term “trust” is, at best, an exercise in futility.
This approach would view the moniker of “trust”, as an accident of
legal history not intended to drive development of modern environmental
policy.189 Public and private trusts strive toward different and, perhaps,
inconsistent ends that cannot be analogized.190 It may simply be best to
view the word “trust” as having a unique meaning in each of these circumstances. This would allow the public trust doctrine more unfettered parameters in which to expand. Accepting this view would also argue against any
proposal to graft a new development in private trust law onto public trust
theory because this might compound the problem of the flawed analogy.
Conceding this, in light of the movement to reimagine the public
trust doctrine and expand its contours to address the complexity of modern
environmental needs, perhaps there is one useful strand of private trust
law that may be helpful. One overlooked aspect of private trust law might
be borrowed for public trust law to make it both more effective and less
fraught with uncertainty.
This modest proposal is to look to a specific new development in
private trust law to address some of the difficulties of implementing the
public trust doctrine: the rise of the directed trust. It is worth exploring
whether a “directed trust” approach, rapidly gaining favor in traditional
private trusts, might be productively grafted onto environmental law and
188
See Zachary C. Kleinsasser, Public and Private Property Rights: Regulatory and Physical
Takings and the Public Trust Doctrine, 32 B.C. ENV’T AFF. L. REV. 421, 422–24 (2005).
189
See Huffman, supra note 10, at 368 (arguing that “the public trust doctrine cannot be
explained or understood as a branch of the law of trusts”); Fish Out of Water, supra note 7,
at 538 (“The categorizations of trusts are dependent upon the identification of the three essential parties to a trust relationship. As indicated above, three distinct entities are relevant
to a trust’s creation and implementation: the creator, the trustee, and the beneficiary. Who
are the creator, trustee, and beneficiary of the alleged trust of the public trust doctrine?”).
190
See Huffman, supra note 10, at 369.
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policy. How and where this might best be done is not entirely clear. However, just as the concept of a directed trust arose to fill a gap in traditional private trust law, a similar concept may fill a gap in the way in
which the public trust doctrine—or the desire for an expanded public
trust doctrine—works in the environmental protection realm.
A.

The “Directed Trust” in Modern Trust Law

In a traditional trust, the settlor conveys legal title to property to
a trustee who then, in accordance with the terms of the trust agreement,
relevant local law, and traditional fiduciary responsibilities, manages it
for the benefit of the intended beneficiaries. Not only does the trustee
manage the trust assets, but the trustee also has legal title to those assets.
The concept of the “directed trust” has evolved as “trust law has developed over recent decades to allow the duties of a trustee to be separated
among various fiduciaries.”191 At its core, the concept of a “directed trust”
allows a settlor to name someone other than a trustee to have decision
making authority over some aspects of the trust and its corpus.192 That
is, a directed trust still has trustees as does any other trust. But, it also
has “directors” with a distinct role to play.193
Over the years, many states developed individual statutes allowing,
under different names, trust “protectors” or trust “advisors” or trust “directors” to participate in the functioning of a trust.194 Although all of these
terms are still in use and have some differences in meaning, for reasons
described below, this Article will use the terms “directed trust” and “trust
director.”195 While the concept was gaining popularity, there was much
uncertainty on such fundamental issues as the correct terminology for
this role196 and the relationship between the trustees and those serving
191

James Kronenberg & Dana Fitzsimons, Is Good Faith Really a Standard of Care?,
SA001 ALI-CLE 121 (July 19–20, 2018) Westlaw.
192
See John D. Morley & Robert H. Sitkoff, Making Directed Trusts Work: The Uniform
Directed Trust Act, 44 ACTEC L.J. 3, 5–6 (2019).
193
See Jocelyn Borowsky, Directed Trusts from a Delaware Perspective, TSWB20-ALI
-CLE 67 (Mar. 24, 2015) Westlaw.
194
A leading example of this was the directed trust law of Delaware which, in many
respects, helped to shape the development of this area of law nationwide. For a discussion
of Delaware directed trust law pre-UDTA, see generally id.
195
To preserve the original language of the authors, in any quote used in this Article, I
have retained the author’s preferred term regardless of whether it was advisor, or protector, or trustee. Unfortunately, this may lead to some linguistic confusion. However, I
intend that the terms be used synonymously for purposes of this discussion.
196
For example, in Robert A. Stein & Benjamin Orzeske, The Revolution Continues:
Toward Greater Modernization and Uniformity in Trust and Estate Law, 76 BENCH &
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in director capacity. Perhaps most controversially, there was a lack of
clarity with respect to the fiduciary obligations, if any, that such directors would have, either directly or vis-à-vis the trustees.197 As the role of
trust directors expanded, there were critical questions about their responsibilities still left unanswered. Indeed, one commentator referred to
them as “an orphan of the law.”198
However, in 2017, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Statutes adopted the Uniform Directed Trust Act (“UDTA”)
to propose a comprehensive, consistent approach to the directed trust.199
This replaced an earlier, less comprehensive treatment of directed trusts

BAR MINN. 20, 22 (2019), the authors discuss the ambiguities that exist when inconsistent
names are used for parties playing roles that are very similar and the dramatic consequences that this may have for liability and other substantive disputes.
197
The debate over the fiduciary obligations of trust directors before the enactment of the
Uniform Directed Trust Act is explored comprehensively in Alexander A. Bove, Jr., A
Protector by Any Other Name . . . ., 8 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 389 (2016); Alexander
A. Bove, Jr., The Case Against the Trust Protector, 37 ACTEC L.J. 77 (2011) (criticizing
the confusion with respect to fiduciary obligations that arises from vague rules on
directed trusts and trust protectors); Stewart E. Sterk, Trust Protectors, Agency Costs and
Fiduciary Duty, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2761 (2006); Wayne E. Reames, Beyond UTC Section
808 and the Uniform Directed Trust Act, 45 ACTEC L.J. 61 (2019) (suggesting that many
of these difficulties persist even after the promulgation of the UDTA); Trust Advisors, 78
HARV. L. REV. 1230 (1965); Philip J. Ruce, The Trustee and the Trust Protector: A Question
of Fiduciary Power. Should a Trust Protector be Held to a Fiduciary Standard?, 59 DRAKE
L. REV. 67 (2010); Lawrence A. Frolik, Trust Protectors: Why Have They Become “The Next
Best Thing?”, 50 REAL PROP., TR. & EST. L.J. 267 (2015).
198
Paul B. Miller, Regularizing the Trust Protector, 103 IOWA L. REV. 2097 (2018).
199
NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L., UNIFORM DIRECTED TRUST ACT (2017)
[hereinafter UDTA]. For additional commentary on the UDTA, see generally James P.
Spica, From Strength to Strength: A Comment on Morley and Sitkoff’s Making Directed
Trusts Work, 44 ACTEC L.J. 215 (2019); Morley & Sitkoff, supra note 192, at 3; James
P. Spica, Used Not Only as Directed: Michigan’s Adaptation of the Uniform Directed
Trust Act, 64 WAYNE L. REV. 339 (2018) [hereinafter Michigan] (describing the specific
process of incorporating the UDTA in Michigan trust law); Erica E. Lord et al., Directed
Trust And Other Modifications, SZ016-ALI-CLE 1 (2018) Westlaw; ROBERT F. SITKOFF
ET AL., Trusts, Beneficiaries, Directors! The Uniform Directed Trust Act Can Conjure a
Hollywood Ending from Even the Most Difficult Family Script, in 52ND ANNUAL HECKERLING INSTITUTE ON ESTATE PLANNING (2018); William D. Lucius & Shirley B. Whitenack,
Directed Trusts: A Primer on the Bifurcation of Trust Powers, Duties and Liabilities in
Special Needs Planning, 15 NAELA J. 71 (2019); Alexis Gettier et al., New Direction: The
Connecticut Uniform Directed Trust Act, 33 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 274 (2020) (describing
the specific attributes of Connecticut’s adaptation of the UDTA); David Biscoe Bingham,
Arkansas Enacts Version of the Uniform Directed Trust Act: Relief for “Directed Trustees”
Begins in 2020, 55 WTR ARK. L. 10 (2020) (describing the specific attributes of Arkansas’s
adaptation of the UDTA); and Miller, supra note 198, passim.
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in the Uniform Trust Code.200 The UTDA also paved the way for expansion of the use of trust directors since some significant ambiguities have
been resolved.201
First, with respect to clarifying terminology, the UDTA adopted
the term “trust director” rather than “protector” or “advisor.”202 Various
state statutes and commentators still use the popular “trust protector.”203
However, this Article will use the term “trust director” in deference to
the choice made in the UDTA and in the hope that greater consistency
may come to the trust lexicon.
At its core, a directed trust exists when “the terms of the trust
grant a person other than a trustee a power over some aspect of the trust’s
administration.”204 The trustee remains the legal owner of the property
and continues to have the rights and responsibilities of traditional trustees. However, a trust director has the authority and responsibility to
direct the actions of the trustee in various ways specified by the settlor
in the trust instrument. These responsibilities can be quite broad or
fairly narrow, depending on the vision of the settlor. Unlike trustees who
hold legal title to the trust res and the beneficiaries who hold an equitable claim to it, a trust director has no ownership interest in the trust
property.205 However, a trust director is given specific authority to “direct” the trustee on various matters identified by the settlor.206
The UDTA recognizes that the settlor lays out the exact nature of
the director’s powers in the trust agreement.207 Thus, the exact scope of
200

NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L., UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 808 (2010) (amended
in 2018 to note that “[f]ormer UTC Section 808 was largely superseded by the Uniform
Directed Trust Act in 2017”). In contrast to earlier attempts to codify directed trusts, the
“UDTA deftly addresses the question of the fiduciary character of trust protection, and
it also offers clear statements on the content and directionality of protectors’ duties, and
the impact of the latter on conventional fiduciary liability rules.” Miller, supra note 198,
at 2108. The UTC’s § 808 is discussed more fully in Ruce, supra note 197, at 82–84.
201
See Morley & Sitkoff, supra note 192, at 6–7.
202
There has been much discussion with respect to the distinctions—subtle and otherwise—
between these different terms. See, e.g., Lord et al., supra note 199.
203
Will Sleeth, The Rise of Litigation Involving Trust Protectors, EST. CONFLICTS (Apr. 5,
2016), https://www.estateconflicts.com/trust-protectors/ [https://perma.cc/PX8B-KQ6H].
204
UDTA, supra note 199, § 1 cmt.
205
Id. at Comment to § 12 (“[I]n a directed trusteeship, title to trust property belongs only
to the trustee and not to the trust director.”). See also Morley & Sitkoff, supra note 192,
at 6 (noting that a trust director “[d]oes not hold legal title to the trust property and is
not a trustee”); id. at 54 (“In the usual case, a trust director would not have custody of the
trust property.”).
206
Morley & Sitkoff, supra note 192, at 6.
207
UDTA, supra note 199, § 1 cmt.
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the director’s authority and responsibility will vary depending on the
trust document. However, the director’s powers could include “a power
over the investment, management, or distribution of trust property or
other matters of trust administration.”208 Depending on the way the
settlor defined the trust director’s obligations, there is a range of activities that the director is able to undertake on his or her own,209 as well as
a number of actions that the director may direct the trustee(s) to undertake or for which the trustees need the director’s approval.210
While the UDTA’s list of potential powers for a trust director is
211
broad, some of those powers most relevant in the context of drawing an
analogy for environmental protection include the ways in which a trust
director may have the power to:
•
•

•
•
•
•

“[A]cquire, dispose of, exchange, or retain an investment”;212
“[A]dopt a particular valuation of trust property or
determine the frequency or methodology of valuation”;213
“[S]elect a custodian for trust assets”;214
“[M]odify, reform, terminate, or decant a trust”;215
“[P]rosecute, defend, or join an action, claim, or judicial proceeding relating to the trust”;216
“[V]eto or approve the actions of a trustee.”217

In addition, a trust director also has “any further power appropriate to the exercise or nonexercise of a power of direction”218 which could
include such things as “mak[ing] a report or accounting to a beneficiary
208

Id. § 2(5).
Id. (“A power of direction may . . . be structured as a power to act independently—for
example, by amending the terms of a trust or releasing a trustee from liability.”).
210
Id. (“A power of direction may be structured as a power to direct the trustee in the
exercise of the trustee’s powers—for example a power to direct the trustee in the investment or management of the trust property.”).
211
See Morley & Sitkoff, supra note 192, at 10–11 (describing the broad scope of the
power of direction).
212
UDTA, supra note 199, § 6(a).
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Id.
217
Id. § 9(a).
218
UDTA, supra note 199, § 6(b)(1).
209
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or other interested party.”219 Thus, these obligations and rights of the
trust director will vary to include those specific things that the settlor
believed were most critical to protecting the rights of all the beneficiaries
and protecting the health and value of the trust res.
The breadth of each of these powers is varied in scope and can have
an enormous range. For example, the “power to direct trust investments
may be a plenary power to direct the investment of all the trust’s assets or
a power to veto the sale of a single ‘heirloom’ investment.”220 A settlor may
intend to vest the trust director with expansive control over all or most of
a trust’s assets—or, can direct the director’s authority only to an asset with
particular value or complexity.221 The exact nature of the scope and status
of the director’s responsibilities is “left to the fertile minds of lawyers.”222
The role of a trust director can be envisioned as an affirmative
power to direct the actions of the trustees or it may be framed in a more
limited, potentially passive way that requires that trustees seek the
consent of the trust director on matters of particular significance to the
settlor.223 Alternatively, the UDTA also contemplates the possibility of
“springing” obligations for a trust director that would mean that the director “would not be under a duty to act unless requested to do so by the
beneficiary.”224 In this scenario, the trust director could be called upon to
act when a beneficiary had reason to seek the protection of a director’s
judgement or action on a particular matter of concern, particularly if the
beneficiary had doubts about the actions of the trustee.225
219

Id.
Michigan, supra note 199, at 367. A similar point is made in Lord et al., supra note 199.
221
Michigan, supra note 199, at 367.
222
Miller, supra note 198, at 2098.
223
This distinction was drawn long before the formality of the UDTA was created. See
Trust Advisors, supra note 197, at 1230 (“It is convenient to distinguish between trust
advisors with powers of direction and those possessing only consent powers.”).
224
UDTA, supra note 199, § 8. See also Morley & Sitkoff, supra note 192, at 36 (“[A] trust
director’s duties could arise at a particular moment, rather than applying continuously,
such that the director would not be under a constant obligation to monitor the administration of a trust.”); Gettier et al., supra note 199, at 287 (“[C]lients may wish to establish
trusts that are directed by trust directors as to investments because a trustee is uncomfortable overseeing a particular trust asset or a trust with highly concentrated
holdings and would prefer that the investment responsibility be bifurcated.”).
225
Miller, supra note 198, at 2104–05 (as was described in more detail: “The particular
functions to a protector performs [sic] may include constitutive functions, advisory
functions, supervisory functions, and managerial functions. First, a protector will serve
a constitutive function when called upon to make decisions about ways in which the trust
is constituted. . . . Second, a protector will perform an advisory function where called
upon to give nonbinding advice to trustees and/or beneficiaries in connection with ongoing
220
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Resolving the intricate question of fiduciary obligation, the UDTA
establishes that trust directors do have traditional, enforceable fiduciary
obligations attached to those areas in which they have the authority to
act. With respect to the trustees they direct (“directed trustees”) the
standard is “willful misconduct.”226 These decisions in the UDTA resolved
the thorniest of the debates among jurisdictions that differed in their
approaches to these questions.227 If a trustee is directed to take a particular action by a trust director, the trustee will only be liable for a breach
of fiduciary duty if willful misconduct was engaged in by the trustee
when the trustee followed the direction of the trust director.228
In the realm of the private trust, the use of a trust director is
rapidly expanding.229 With the promulgation of the UDTA and the uniformity it proposes—particularly with respect to issues such as liability and
fiduciary responsibility—it should be expected that this trend toward
directed trusts will continue in the estate and wealth management arena.
B.

The Appeal of a “Directed Trust” Approach in Environmental
Protection

The functions that a trust director may play in a traditional trust
may, by analogy, be extraordinarily useful in the environmental context.
administration of the trust. Third, a protector will serve a supervisory function where
required to keep abreast of trust administration, to monitor and evaluated trustee performance and/or the condition of trust property, to monitor and evaluated beneficiaries’
claims for distributions, and to give or withhold consent to decisions provisionally made
by trustees. Finally, a protector will perform a managerial function when granted responsibility for making binding discretionary decisions.”).
226
See Michigan, supra note 199, at 369 (“The trustee may be liable for any loss that
results from her compliance with a trust protector’s directions if the direction is contrary
to the terms of the trust or constitutes a breach of a fiduciary duty that the trust protector owes to the trust beneficiaries.”); and Lucius & Whitenack, supra note 199, at 11.
The complexity of applying the willful misconduct standard is explored more fully in Jane
Ditelberg, Am I My Brother’s Keeper: Willful Misconduct and the Directed Trustee Under
the Uniform Directed Trust Act, 44 ACTEC L.J. 207, 211 (2019) (further exploration of the
complexity in applying the “willful misconduct standard”).
227
Morley & Sitkoff, supra note 192, at 32 (“[T]he UDTA employs the novel and technically innovative strategy of absorbing the existing fiduciary law of trusteeship. In most
instances, the UDTA applies to a trust director the same fiduciary duties that would apply
to a trustee in a like position and under similar circumstances . . . . [T]he UDTA prescribes
clear rules that negate any duty of cross-monitoring among trust directors and trustees
while at the same time requiring trust directors and trustees to share information.”).
228
Id. at 40.
229
See Bove, supra note 197, at 1 (observing that the concept of using a trust director has
“rapidly become one of the most popular and valuable tools for estate planning attorneys
today”).
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Having someone in the role of a “trust director” can help address some
of the limitations on the ability of the traditional trust doctrine to effectively protect the interest of multiple generations in ecological resources.
It may also enable this to be done with some efficiency.230 Is it possible to
envision a role to be played by an entity other than the traditional legislative “trustee” to offer direction that allows it to better act on behalf of the
present and future beneficiaries of the trust? Is it possible to envision a
role to be played by an entity other than the judiciary to determine when
the acts of a trustee should be questioned or overruled? If even possible,
is it wise?
The powers of a trust director, and the way these powers can be
customized make this a particularly useful role for responding, efficiently
and expertly, to changed circumstances that the settlor may not have
been able to predict.231 A brief look at the permissible powers of a trust
director may be useful in the environmental context.
A trust director may be given the power to “acquire, dispose of,
exchange, or retain an investment.”232 In the environmental context, this
could mean the obligation to retain public resources rather than allocate
them for private development.233 It may mean safely disposing of or remediating for retention those publicly owned assets and resources that
230

See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621,
670 (2004) (noting the “usefulness in minimizing agency costs” that comes with using a
trust director).
231
The importance of this aspect of trust directors is noted repeatedly. See, e.g., Sterk,
supra note 197, at 2762–63 (“[T]he settlor will typically be dead for much of the trust’s
duration. Practically, the settlor’s demise often makes it impossible to determine whether
the trustee is faithfully representing the wishes of the dead settlor. Even if the settlor left
explicit instructions on some matters, the settlor could not possibly have anticipated all
of the decisions a trustee would face. . . . [T]he settlor’s lack of foresight . . . becomes more
serious as the duration of the trust increases.”); id. at 2763 (“As the living embodiment of the
dead settlor, the protector has the potential to mitigate the foresight problems associated
with dead hand control.”); id. at 2794 (“[T]he settlor will typically have appointed the
protector precisely because the settlor could not anticipate the circumstances that have,
in fact, unfolded.”); Reames, supra note 197, at 64 (noting that “moderns statutes . . .
contemplate empowering protectors to take action to account for changes circumstances
or unexpected situations”); Lord et al., supra note 199 (“[D]irected trust structures and
trust modifications are becoming increasingly more common to effectuate the intended
purpose of a trust or respond to unanticipated changes affecting the trust’s creators or
beneficiaries.”). See also Richard C. Ausness, The Role of Trust Protectors in American Trust
Law, 45 REAL PROP., TRUST & EST. L.J. 319, 321 (2010) (noting that the trust director
function is most useful “if the trust is a large one or is expected to last a long time,” a
characterization that would clearly fit most public trusts in the environmental realm).
232
UDTA, supra note 199, § 6(a).
233
No Ordinary Lawsuit, supra note 6, at 50.
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are posing an environmental risk.234 It may also mean, through the
principled and responsible use of market purchase or eminent domain,
acquiring investments in assets that must be preserved for the future.235
A trust director may also have the authority to “adopt a particular
valuation of trust property or determine the frequency or methodology
of valuation.”236 One of the difficulties in protecting ecological interests
is that it is difficult to quantify or account for the value of those things
that are priceless.237 Thus, a trust director in the environmental context
should be one with scientific expertise who can look objectively at the
value of environmental resources and determine their tangible and intangible value both now and in the future; the way in which current use
may or may not deplete (or increase) future value; and the methodology
of determining whether the value will be depleted or can be renewed.
In private trusts, when appropriate, a trust director can also have
the authority to “select a custodian for trust assets.”238 This power is
particularly valuable when there is an asset in the trust that is complex
and requires expertise to care for it and preserve its value and wellbeing.239 In the environmental context as well, there can be a need for
someone to be a custodian for trust assets and to care for them with expertise and dedication to the needs of both the current and future generations.240 Certainly, trustees can play this role. However, a custodian with
specific expertise about a particular type of assets can contribute more
effectively to doing so.
A trust director may also be granted, by the settlor, the ability to
“modify, reform, terminate, or decant a trust.”241 This is a fairly broad—
and, thus, potentially dangerous—power for a settlor to grant to a trust
director.242 However, it builds in a necessary flexibility to allow someone
the authority to respond to changed conditions and information in a nimble
way—without being unduly tied to the demands of a settlor whose knowledge of future developments may have been limited or short-sighted.243
234

See Brian E. Gray, Ensuring the Public Trust, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 973, 988 (2012).
See Berliner, supra note 6, at 350.
236
UDTA, supra note 199, § 6(a).
237
Kanner, supra note 7, at 97.
238
UDTA, supra note 199, § 6(a).
239
Morley & Sitkoff, supra note 192, at 10.
240
WEISS, supra note 9, at 7.
241
UDTA, supra note 199, § 6(a).
242
Ausness, supra note 231, at 3.
243
This may be a power particularly necessary in the environmental sense. See Fish Out
of Water, supra note 7, at 544 (“The people’s intentions with respect to land and water
resources have changed over time. They will continue to change in the future. The idea
235
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A trust director has the authority, if the trust instrument so
provides, to “veto or approve the actions of a trustee.”244 In the environmental context, this can be a very useful brake on specifically delineated
activities (or failures to act) that are deemed by the trust director to be
impermissible or harmful in the short or long term.245
Finally, and in a very practical way—given the roundabout progress
of litigation such as Juliana—a trust director has the authority to
“prosecute, defend, or join an action, claim, or judicial proceeding relating
to the trust.”246 A trust director has the legal authority to defend the interests of the beneficiaries—any or all of them—in court against anyone
who would harm the assets of the trust.247 This is the case even if the
person doing the harm is a trustee or another beneficiary and regardless
of whether the harm results from an act of commission or omission.248
This power allows greater weight to be given to the wishes of the
settlor.249 Indeed, in the private trust context “[d]irected trusts grew out of
the settlor’s desire to retain or assert more control over trust management
while at the same time benefitting from professional management of the
that the people of one era can be the creator of a binding trust for the people of a later era
is simply contrary to democratic theory. It would be a strict violation of democratic principles for the original voters and legislators of a state to limit, through a trust, the choices
of the voters and the legislators of today.”).
244
UDTA, supra note 199, § 9 (a).
245
Trust Advisors, supra note 197, at 1230.
246
UDTA, supra note 199, § 6(a).
247
Id. § 6(a) cmt.
248
EDWARD E. CHASE, New Developments: Trust Protectors, Directed Trusts, 11 LA. CIV.
L.J. TREATISE § 5:11 (2d ed. 2019).
249
See id. (“A trust protector . . . is vested by the settlor with specified powers regarding
the trustee’s management of the trust.”); id. (“By designating a trust protector, the
settlor’s interest in managing the assets for the benefit of the beneficiaries is better
protected.”); Miller, supra note 198, at 2099–2100 (calling the development of the directed
trust “entirely to the credit of trust lawyers aiming to make trusts more responsive to
settlor intent”); id. at 2100 (“[G]iven that protectors are usually engaged to enhance
protection for settlors’ expectations, protectors raise difficult questions about the proper
objects of trust fiduciary duties.”); id. at 2103 (noting “there is one important generalization that can be made of protectors: namely, that the core function of the protector is that
of promoting respect for the settlor’s intentions in the administration of a trust”); Ruce,
supra note 197, at 68 (noting the important role of “making decisions related to the trust
that the settlor is unable to make, most often because the settlor is deceased”); id. at 69
(speaking of “problems . . . often not foreseen by the settlor at the time of the trust’s
creation, and because the trust is irrevocable—and because the settlor is often dead—the
settlor has very little input in how the trust adapts to these problems”); id. at 96 (“When
acting in conjunction with the trustee, the protector can bring valuable insight regarding
the original desires of the settlor.”).
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trust.”250 The existence of trust directors can be an asset to beneficiaries
seeking to ensure that the trustees at any given time take their obligations seriously and that there is an efficient way to address deficiencies
in trustee performance.251
This inability of the beneficiaries to take effective action may be
particularly pronounced in scenarios where the beneficiaries are from future generations, poorly informed, disorganized, or lacking in resources.252
A trust director, in essence, is one who understands the intent and the
values of the settlor and has broad or tailored authority to defend that
intent and those values when they are under threat. The reasons that a
private party may desire to have a trust director are similar to the
reasons one might be desired in the environmental context.253
Settlor intent is protected by investing the trust director with
sufficient authority to override the actions of the trustees and the subjective preferences of the beneficiaries when necessary.254 This can also
250

Borowsky, supra note 193.
See Sterk, supra note 197, at 2768.
[H]ow does the settlor ensure that the trustee acts in accordance with
the settlor’s expectations? Trust law’s traditional response is to enlist
the trust beneficiaries as monitors, through the mechanism of an action
for breach of fiduciary duty. By subjecting the trustee to potential liability,
trust law encourages the trustee to comply with settlor’s instructions.
But monitoring by the beneficiaries is both imperfect and costly. First,
the beneficiaries themselves often lack the expertise to detect breach.
Second, the beneficiaries may be dependent on the trustee, and hence
they may be reluctant to take action to discipline the trustee.
Id.
252
This is precisely the case in environmental claims brought on behalf of future generations.
253
For further discussion of this analogy, see Miller, supra note 198, at 2103–04 (“[T]he
settlor may have reason to question (if not necessarily to doubt) the trustworthiness of
her trustees. The settlor may . . . also have reason to question her beneficiaries’ capacity or
motivation to effectively monitor the trustee and to take enforcement action as needed on
bases that would resonate with the settlor given her intentions (which may, or may not, be
aligned with the particular interests of particular beneficiaries). The settlor may anticipate that changes bearing on the relative desert of her beneficiaries might justify adjustment
of beneficial entitlements or the exercise of dispositive discretions, but worry that the
trustee may not respond appropriately. Additionally, or alternatively . . . the settlor may
worry about the impact of changes in law, policy, or socio-economic context on the realization
of her intentions, and doubt the wisdom of leaving it to his or her trustees and/or the courts
to respond to same. Finally, the settlor might be generally skeptical about the court’s
capacity or willingness to effectively and efficiently protect her interest in sound administration of the trust.”).
254
See id. at 2089 (“Trust protectors disrupt common assumptions about the fiduciary administration of trusts. Protectors are interpolated between trustees and beneficiaries . . . in
251
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entail a mediating role in which the party in the role of the trust director
can assist the beneficiaries and trustees in better understanding each
other and resolving their disputes. In a trust that involves a complex res,
this has an even more vital function.
C.

Implementation of a “Directed Trust” Approach to
Environmental Protection in American Law

In the context of private trusts, it has been predicted that the
increased use of trust directors “will represent the single most profound
change in trust design, administration and practice of the first half of the
twenty-first century.”255 Whether or not this will come to be is a matter
of much spirited speculation among estate planners and asset managers.256 However, this Article makes a modest proposal: Those concerned
with protecting the interests of future generations should consider whether
there is a way to incorporate directed trust principles into environmental
law and policy.
Hopefully, the potential advantages of having a person, entity or
institution take on the role of a “trust director” for environmental affairs
have been demonstrated above in the description of the ways in which
this role, crafted for private trusts, might be analogized to the environmental protection regime.257 Is it possible to have an appropriate entity
that could function as a “trust director” when it comes to natural resources? Is it possible to add to the imperfect and uncertain trust model
a well-disciplined, highly expert group of policymakers who could bring
to public debate the skills and attributes that trust directors have in the
private context? Is it feasible to have someone charged with representing
the members of future generations at all levels of present-day decision
making? Is it possible to carve out specific responsibilities that are clear
and well suited to a trust director’s expertise?
Certainly, this would be a challenge for many significant reasons:

the administration of trusts. Generally speaking, protectors provide enhanced protection
for settlor intent.”). Thus, while “centuries of legal development have placed the trustee
at the center of a trust and its administration . . . [w]ith the promulgation of the UDTA,
the law of trusts is catching up to the rise of flexible, multiparty trust administration by
trustees in concert with trust directors.” Morley & Sitkoff, supra note 192, at 61.
255
Reames, supra note 197, at 61.
256
See generally id. at 61.
257
See supra Section IV.C.
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As in the private trust context, it would complicate
the traditional trust paradigm by introducing a
new set of complex relationships.258
This problem is compounded by skepticism—including my own—about both whether a trust theory is the best paradigm for protecting the claims
of future generations and whether trust theory
should be expanded to incorporate a broader swath
of resources. It may seem incongruous to advocate
for a new trust principle while at the same time
expressing deep skepticism about the wisdom and
applicability of the trust paradigm per se.259
If there is uncertainty as to who should be considered the settlor of the trust, then determining the
responsibilities of a trust director with any credibility becomes far more difficult.260
If there is uncertainty as to who should be considered the trustee(s) of the trust, this must be resolved
so that there is clarity as to who the trust directors
should be asked to direct.261
Given the critical importance of separation of powers
much thought must be given to which branch of government any trust directors would belong and what
authority, if any, the directors should have to make
demands of the political branches of government.262

In spite of these very real challenges, envisioning a “trust director” is suited for fostering the type of intergenerational solidarity needed
for effective long-term protection of complex environmental assets.263
258
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This extra layer of protection can enhance the way in which legal obligations are “faithfully executed” but also uphold the higher and less tangible standards of fiduciary obligations.264
Having a trust director in the environmental context would mean
having someone responsible, explicitly, for protecting the interests of
future generations.265 This “modest proposal” would urge a return to the
lofty, but still merely aspirational “trust” language of NEPA and flesh it
out in more meaningful detail.266 NEPA would seem to be the most convenient place in which to graft a far more robust environmental obligation that binds generations to each other.267 However, as of now, “no court
has expressly held that this language provides a federal public trust
mandate.”268 Yet, others have already suggested that “Congress should
amend the National Environmental Policy Act to incorporate a substantive trust protection standard similar to that found in some state NEPAequivalent laws, and provide mechanisms for citizen enforcement. Such
legislation should provide for natural resource accountings, particularly
carbon accountings.”269 Perhaps, as will be discussed below, this is the
context in which a role for trust directors may emerge.
Given concerns about separation of powers, it would be difficult
at this point to situate a “trust director” of any sort within any specific
branch of government.270 However, there are a number of ways in which
a directed trustee principle may still become part of the way in which we
view environmental stewardship. These four suggestions are intended to
start a discussion of this model.
First, and as the most modest of proposals, the “trust director”
model may simply be a way in which those outside government—in the
264
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scientific community in particular—can frame their moral responsibility.271
They would not have any enforceable power to “direct” that anything can
be done. But a careful review of the responsibilities of directed trustees—to
make an accounting, to warn a trustee against particular actions, to defend specific interests of the settlor, to account for the value of the res, and
to urge legal action to defend beneficiaries’ interests—may be a useful
framework for activity that can seem to be overly political, partisan, or
merely reactive to particular threats rather than helpfully proactive.272
Environmental advocacy groups might consider charting their
mission statements like those of trust agreements creating trust protectors—with a carefully defined set of obligations that they will undertake
to ensure that the “trustees” are meeting their obligations.273 Although
they may not be legally enforceable, having such a well-crafted model or
plan for their activities can lead to greater credibility and a more effective way to bring their work to the attention of the relevant constituencies. To date, environmental advocacy groups can do a great deal of good
in the public arena if they are well-respected, fact based, and reliable
with respect to both the quality of their data and the fairmindedness of
their advocacy. In reimagining their role in the light of trust directors,
advocacy groups may have a model for their public presence. They can
express well-reasoned views on the nature, value and health of the corpus,
the needs of the beneficiaries, and the obligations that they would hope that
the trustees would pursue. This can be an effective posture in the public
arena, and approaching their role this way can enhance the way in which
such groups may play a valuable role in addressing intractable issues.
Second, should courts in cases such as Juliana, reach the conclusion
that there is, in fact, a public trust for a wider range of environmental interests than previously believed, the trust director model can be particularly useful.274 As noted above, the result of such a conclusion would be the
obligation to refer the matter back to the political branches to address
the breaches of the trust, vel non, in the development of a workable plan
of action. This would require extensive supervision by a court comprised
of generalist judges who are not experts in environmental matters.275
271
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However, it could be helpful if courts employed trust director principles
in their orders. As the balance of authority currently stands:
[A] court could require an agency to prepare a climate
recovery plan, but the specific details of the plan would
ultimately come from the agency, not the court. The judiciary’s role is to ensure that the political branches protect
trust assets from substantial impairment, not to dictate
specific environmental policies. Substantive decisions about
how best to protect and manage trust assets would remain
in the hands of the democratically elected branches.276
When a trust breach—or potential breach—is sent back to the
political branches to resolve, the individual in charge of reviewing the
progress made, testifying before the court as to whether trust obligations
are being met, and the merit of remedial proposals developed can be
charged to view his or her role as that of a trust director. 277 That is, the
work that must be done can be structured as the work of a trust director
who directs the trustees in government as to what must be done to meet
the obligations of the public trust. Ultimately, it will be up to the courts in
such cases to determine whether the remedy proposed is correct and
276
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complete. But, rather than address the political branch directly, with a
level of detail and expertise that the courts lack, a “trust director” model
may be helpful. The court can select the person with the expertise to oversee the remedial process and offer broad guidance as to what an appropriate solution would entail. Then, this individual, viewing his or her role
as a “trust director” can then offer greater direction to the “trustees” in the
political branches to develop the comprehensive solution that is necessary.
Third, and more proactively, as NEPA marks its golden anniversary, it may be worth reexamining whether trust director principles can
be incorporated into this “Magna Carta” of American environmental law
to breathe life into its aspirational trust language.278
For example, NEPA’s environmental impact process requires
environmental impact statements (“EIS”) be prepared on a project-byproject basis.279 It is now almost rote to state that NEPA requires that an
environmental impact statement be prepared for:
every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment . . . on—
(I) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot
be avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses
of man’s environment and the maintenance and
enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments
of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.280
The language of the EIS requirement could be amended to require
more explicitly that the EIS review the impact of the activity or nonactivity on future generations.281 This would not be an analysis only of
the specific action proposed but also of the way in which that activity
would exacerbate or contribute to problems created by other activities.
In a sense, this part of the EIS would function like the accounting done
278
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by a trust director to examine the value of the res that can be impacted
by specific actions of a trustee and to propose or direct ways in which
harm to that res can be mitigated or avoided.282 An accounting is a way in
which we can understand what we have been bequeathed by our predecessors. Were this to be a traditional trust “accounting is the method by
which beneficiaries may ensure proper management of their property.”283
Such an accounting in the environmental context may accomplish very
similar things. This activity may not be capable of preventing a harmful
act from moving forward—just as a traditional EIS alone may not halt
a dangerous project.284 However, it can generate a reliable record of the
harms that, once publicly available, may halt projects based on the undeniable power of public opinion.285 In this, clarity in drafting is critically
important.286 As with private trusts, understanding what the objectives
are is critically important.287 But this need for clarity can be one of the
greatest strengths of this approach. Once the EIS framework is in place to
provide a more detailed framework with respect to the impact on future
beneficiaries, those who review these can look at these statements with
an eye to whether or not they are an accurate accounting.
In addition, under the NEPA framework, it may also be an opportune time to reassess the role of the Council on Environmental Quality
to assess whether it is capable of functioning independently in its current
status in the Executive Office of the President and to consider whether
its mandate may be rewritten, using some of the language of trust director statutes to clearly and succinctly articulate its roles to offer direction, even if it cannot enforce that direction.288
282
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Finally, it may be worth exploring whether the EPA structure can
incorporate “trust director” principles in each of its divisions to articulate
a discrete set of responsibilities to future generations that can or should
be reviewed and to propose “direction” to policy makers as to how this
may best be accomplished.289 It has been said that “[D]escribing the relationship of public officials to the public as one of trust conveys nothing
of the fiduciary responsibilities owed by a trustee to a beneficiary under
trusts law. The government official’s general responsibility to the public
is political, not legal.”290 However, by embedding directed trust principles
into the mindset of the way public officials organize their work may have
tangible benefits.291 Certainly, there is ample opportunity for this position to become politicized or for it to be undertaken without a fully objective view. However, over time, a cadre of committed, knowledgeable,
nonpolitical appointees may find this to be an opportunity to serve future
beneficiaries in a discrete way, using defined trust principles to address
potential future harms and propose solutions that may be implemented
by the more politically accountable actors.
CONCLUSION
If it is true that “[t]here is no greater monument to the tradition
of ordered liberty than the nation’s responsible commitment to society
and environment: past, present, and future,”292 then it is the task of each
generation to meet this commitment in ways that are both well-suited to
its time and capable of meeting this sacred responsibility.
At this time, both domestically and internationally, there is increased attention paid to the use of trust theory to do this. However, this
approach has its limitations—and dangers. The concept of directed trusts
has developed to allow those who create private trusts to better ensure
that they achieve the ends for which they are created. Perhaps borrowing
principles from this theory can breathe some life into the public trust
doctrine that are worth exploring as we meet the challenge to serve and
act “as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations.”293
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